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Article

Constitutional Reasonableness
Brandon L. Garrett †
INTRODUCTION
The concept of reasonableness pervades constitutional doctrine. The concept has long served to structure common-law doctrines, from negligence to criminal law, but its rise in constitutional law is more recent. 1 This Article aims to unpack three
dimensions of constitutional reasonableness: (1) what the term
reasonable means in constitutional doctrine; (2) which actors it
applies to; and (3) how it is used. First, the underlying concept
of reasonableness that courts adopt varies, with judges using
competing objective, subjective, utility-based, or custom-based
standards. For some rights, courts incorporate more than one
usage at the same time.2 Second, the objects of the reasonableness standard vary, assessed from the perspective of judges, officials, legislators, or citizens, and from the perspective of individual decisionmakers, or general institutional or government
perspectives. 3 Third, judges may variously apply a constitutional
† Justice Thurgood Marshall Distinguished Professor of Law and White
Burkett Miller Professor of Law and Public Affairs, University of Virginia
School of Law. Many thanks to Kerry Abrams, Anne Coughlin, Barry Friedman,
Toby Heytens, Aziz Huq, Dotan Oliar, Chris Slobogin, Larry Solum, and David
Zaring for their thoughtful comments; to participants at UVA Law incubator
lunch for their comments; and to Elizabeth Hoffman for invaluable research assistance. Copyright © 2017 by Brandon L. Garrett.
1. For an important early commentary on the growing usage of reasonableness in constitutional rights discourse, see George P. Fletcher, The Right and
the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985).
2. See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based
Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 250 (1996) (“ The dominant standards of liability in tort require an objective reasonableness calculus
of social costs and benefits.”).
3. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer ’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 20–22 (1988) (outlining significance of “implicit male norms” in
the reasonable person standard); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment
with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 465–67 (1997) (discussing challenges of
reasonable person evaluation in sexual harassment); Kit Kinports, Criminal
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reasonableness standard to the assertion of defenses, waivers, or
limitations on obtaining a remedy for the violation of a constitutional right. The use of the common term reasonableness to such
different ends can blur distinctions between rights and remedies. Ultimately, I argue that the flexibility and malleability of
reasonableness standards accounts for their ubiquity and utility.
Constitutional standards can—and have—shifted their meaning
entirely, as judges move from one concept or usage of reasonableness, while appearing not to depart from precedent. That ambiguity across multiple dimensions explains both the attraction
and the danger of constitutional reasonableness. In this Article,
I ultimately point to an opportunity in the spread of these doctrines. I argue that there is a better way to conduct constitutional reasonableness: a regulatory approach, in which reasonableness is informed by objective and empirically informed
standards of care.
One could be forgiven for thinking that the concept of reasonableness should be largely irrelevant to constitutional law.
Only one constitutional provision refers to reasonableness in its
text. The Fourth Amendment provides a right to be free from an
“unreasonable” search and seizure. 4 That Clause has engendered complex case law concerning topics as wide-ranging as use
of deadly force, police surveillance, and automobile searches, all
relying to varying degrees on different concepts of reasonableness. Some Supreme Court rulings consist of all-things-considered assessments of the costs and benefits of searches;5 in other
Fourth Amendment areas, the Court asks judges to examine citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy, sometimes admitting
evidence of their subjective beliefs; while in others, the focus is
the perspective of a reasonable police officer. 6

Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71, 72–73 (2007) (explaining the evolution of the reasonable person standard); Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 391–92 (2012) (arguing for normative conception).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397–99 (1989)
(“[T]he question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them . . . .” (citing Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137–39 (1978))); Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 301–02 (2017) (“A tactical Fourth Amendment analysis would focus on whether officers acted contrary to sound police tactics by unreasonably creating a deadly situation . . . .”);
see infra Part II.B.
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Yet that is just the beginning. Each of those breeds of reasonableness review can be found in a range of other constitutional doctrines lacking any textual reference to reasonableness.
Over the past three decades, in a range of constitutional doctrines, the Supreme Court has tightened its embrace of reasonableness and replaced a series of substantive standards for constitutional review with objective reasonableness standards. How
do we decide if a government official receives qualified immunity
from civil liability? We ask whether the official acted reasonably.
How do we decide if a police officer properly used deadly force?
We ask whether the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances. How do we decide whether a constitutional criminal procedure violation deserves a remedy? We ask whether the error
would have affected a reasonable decision by the jurors. 7 How do
we decide if a state judge correctly interpreted the Constitution
in a criminal appeal? We ask whether the judge interpreted the
Constitution reasonably.8 In Williams v. Taylor, Justice O’Connor noted that “[t]he term ‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to
define.” 9 However, she said, “it is a common term in the legal
world and, accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its
meaning.” 10 The commonplace, but highly inconsistent, uses of
the word reasonable may not, however, suggest any settled
meaning—particularly where constitutional interpretation is
concerned.
In Part I of this Article, I explore three dimensions to the
usages of constitutional reasonableness. The first dimension
raises the question of the referent: What is reasonableness?
Commentators have long critiqued reasonable man and reasonable person standards in common law fields for assuming perspectives that, in fact, bring in non-objective assumptions about
conduct. In constitutional law, those questions are equally important, and there are also questions about whether a reasonableness standard need be objective at all. The Supreme Court
has expressed concerns with subjective tests, which can lead to
“an expedition into the minds” of officials, and “produce a grave
and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.” 11 Thus, the
7. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367–68 (1970) (establishing reasonable
doubt rule for juvenile defendants); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488
(1895) (establishing reasonable doubt rule for the federal defense of insanity).
8. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305–10 (1989).
9. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000).
10. Id.
11. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984) (quoting Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
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Court has said, in the Fourth Amendment context, that “objective standards of conduct” better produce “evenhanded law enforcement” than “standards that depend upon the subjective
state of mind of the officer.” 12
Yet the temptation to adopt subjective tests remains. For
example, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, rational basis review ostensibly asks judges to deferentially review reasonable government decisions—yet sometimes the Court asks whether a discriminatory purpose or animus renders the action irrational or unreasonable. 13 Nor is it
always clear how an objective reasonableness test works. In contrast to negligence law, constitutional balancing is rarely utilitarian, explicitly balancing costs and benefits. Often it is not
clearly defined what factors may be balanced or how. Judges
may call the resulting balance reasonable, but it is not always
clear why.14 Moreover, sometimes judges do not want to balance,
but rather declare certain types of actions per se unreasonable.
The resulting uneven coverage of a reasonableness test can
make the constitutional inquiry part objective and part something else.15 Such rulings may have the flavor of negligence and
contract doctrines that rely on custom or industry practice to inform what is reasonable—which I argue is a preferable approach—or they may consist of judicial declarations of per se reasonableness.
A second problem exists: constitutional rights both set expectations for citizens and regulate government actors. The second dimension asks: Who or what is the object of the reasonableness standard—which citizens, government officials, or entities
are being held to a standard of reasonableness? Often it is not
clear—or, it is clear, but the answer varies from right to right or
claim to claim. In some areas, the Supreme Court varies its object, from the reasonable civilian, to the reasonable police officer,
to the reasonable judge assessing the claim, to the reasonable
defense attorney. 16 Should the Fourth Amendment respect reasonable individual expectations of privacy, or an officer’s reason12. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990).
13. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (finding that law’s
“sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests”).
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.A.
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able belief that a search was necessary? The individual’s subjective belief that they were seized, or the officer’s subjective intent
to seize an individual? The text and the doctrine provide no neutral basis for deciding these questions. Along this second dimension, the Court is wholly inconsistent, both within and across
rights, as to whom the object is of the reasonableness standard.
Sometimes we might think that the Constitution should protect
reasonable expectations of citizens against government incursions. We may expect government officials to do more than just
a reasonable job of not violating our constitutional rights—and
we may sometimes find government action reasonable, based on
some fault by the citizen. Sometimes, judges assess the reasonableness of group decisionmakers, asking whether legislation or
administrative action is reasonable. Judges introduce still additional complications where reasonableness for the underlying
constitutional standard of care blends with non-reasonablenessbased constitutional standards, or where reasonableness is used
in a different sense to regulate remedies or standards of review
for possible constitutional violations.
A third problem exists: When a constitutional right is concededly violated, should a remedy depend on a further determination of reasonableness in the eyes of federal judges, as opposed
to reasonableness based on standards of care or validated facts
proven to a jury? Often it does, and not necessarily due to statutory rules, but rather because of court-made remedial limits importing notions of reasonableness. Across this third dimension,
judges engage in extensive stacking of different types of reasonableness inquiries. Reasonableness limits remedies or provides
standards of review for judges asking whether constitutional
rights were violated. Reasonableness can be used to deflect questions whether a right was violated onto another actor; if an official or a judge acted reasonably, then no further inquiry need be
conducted. For example, qualified immunity doctrine in constitutional tort cases uses a reasonableness standard.
Once all three dimensions are set out, one sees just how
problematic constitutional reasonableness can be in operation.
It provides no coherent direction to advise police officers that if
they use deadly force, they must do so reasonably under the circumstances; but, if they do so unreasonably, the Fourth Amendment violation may be deemed by a judge reasonable for qualified immunity purposes. It provides no coherent direction to tell
defense lawyers that unreasonable assistance may violate the
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Sixth Amendment; but, so long as the state judge reasonably denies relief, then there will be no remedy.17 In those examples and
many others, constitutional reasonableness serves not just to
permit constitutional balancing, but to blur lines between a
rights deprivation and a defense or a remedial limitation on that
right. Giving government actors discretion, if there is some
boundary to it, is perfectly fine, but these stacked reasonableness tests obscure the very notion of a right. Professor George
Fletcher has argued in the criminal context, though the concern
applies generally, that: “[t]he reasonable person enables us to
blur the line between justification and excuse, between wrongfulness and blameworthiness, and thus renders impossible any
ordering of the dimensions of liability.”18
In Part II, I detail examples of constitutional reasonableness
in constitutional criminal procedure, the First Amendment, and
the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of these three areas, I describe how judges can blur the three dimensions set out in Part
I, including by defining the standard with reference to individual
or institutional actors and using the term to define rights, remedies, and standards of review. That all of these varying inquiries can be labeled as reasonableness inquiries itself leads to
highly confusing rulings. One can read cases discussing whether,
for example, a state judge was reasonable when deciding
whether the attorney at a criminal trial reasonably decided to
forfeit a defense regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy
the defendant had in a police station, and whether doing so reasonably affected the jurors—who were applying a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when deciding the question of guilt.
Even if the concept of reasonableness can bear inconsistent usages in the context of the same rights, far more clarity is needed
to identify which are used and how.
In Part III, I discuss how a range of prominent commentators have argued that the concept of reasonableness should be
expanded in its use in constitutional interpretation. Some scholars argue that originalist inquiry should begin by asking what
reasonable persons at the time of the drafting of the Constitution
would think; or what reasonable lawyers then would do; or,
scholars argue, that reasonableness standards should be used in
additional areas to conduct constitutional balancing. In contrast,
17. For discussion in the context of habeas corpus, see BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND
POST-CONVICTION LITIGATION 336 (2013).
18. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 962.
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critics raise concerns that doctrines of reasonableness are a poor
fit outside contexts like negligence, in which they refer to standards of care and permit jurors to reflect on what an ordinary person might do. I argue that reasonableness has become overused
precisely because it is susceptible to changing concepts, objects,
and remedies. Judges can turn constitutional standards into
very different animals, without changing the term of the standard. Judges can create exceptions and remedial restrictions that
alternate from objective and subjective reasonableness, or use
both.
In Part IV, I argue that one unanticipated positive consequence of the ubiquity of constitutional reasonableness standards is that judges could improve constitutional reasonableness
by making the standards more defined and informed by empirical evidence. Judges could adopt wholesale what Professor Anthony Amsterdam famously advanced, in the Fourth Amendment context, as a regulatory model in which police discretion
would be confined by written police practices and legislation
within Fourth Amendment limits. 19 Courts could interpret reasonableness to require government officials to regulate on their
own and by deferring to reasonable policies. Taking such a view
requires looking beyond the reasonableness of the individual actors in a case and asking how the system works in the aggregate. 20 There has been a recent revival of academic interest in
such approaches more broadly. Professor Seth Stoughton and I
have argued for an approach, informed and encouraging best
practices, in the Fourth Amendment use of force context.21 Professor Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, as well as Professor Christopher Slobogin, have recently argued that police
should generally be incentivized to adopt regulations. 22 The Supreme Court has adopted this approach in the context of challenges to prison rules that burden constitutional rights. Judges

19. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 409 (1974).
20. For an evaluation of potential aggregation in the criminal law context,
see Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383
(2007) [hereinafter Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law].
21. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 6.
22. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1865 (2015) (arguing existing judicial review is “completely
inadequate” to regulate law enforcement); Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 91 (2016) (arguing that when police agencies
create “statute -like policies,” they must use notice-and-comment rulemaking).
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ask whether they are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” although, as I will describe, that doctrine suggests a cautionary tale about the willingness of judges to carefully review regulation. 23
Now that constitutional reasonableness has become so pervasive, a model in which judges assess reasonableness, as informed by policy and practice, is more feasible across a broad
range of constitutional doctrines. 24 Such an approach encourages the government to write informed regulations, curbing discretion. 25 To be sure, constitutional law can demand difficult interpretative choices in highly contested areas. Perhaps in some
areas, regulation cannot be realistically agreed upon, and one
would worry that self-interested actors would promote practices
that suit their interests. The counter-argument is that, so long
as reasonableness involves protections above a constitutional
floor, those protections should be informed by more than judges’
own views of reasonableness. The aspiration of the approach—
while courts have not had much success in following it—is to do
more than engage in blind judicial deference, and, rather, incentivize informed regulation.
At minimum, I hope to convince readers that existing reasonableness doctrines are inconsistent and multifarious, so that
they are often not even a clear enough form of deference. Even if
constitutional tests can generally be inconsistent or complex,
reasonableness raises its own unique problems as a referent
across the different dimensions discussed. I hope to add more
precision to the use of the term reasonable, but I also hope to call
the inconsistent use of the term into question. The use of reasonableness should be confined to clearly defined dimensions. Still
better, I argue we can aspire to a regulatory vision of reasonable
and informed regulation. The judicial attraction, unfortunately,
to the word reasonable may be precisely due to the ambiguity
and malleability of its use across so many dimensions of constitutional doctrine. It is no wonder a word so pervasively used in
23. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
24. It is a larger question whether drawing on administrative law is a useful move in a range of areas. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward
Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2051
(2016). To what degree courts should consider empirical research when developing rights is also a question beyond the scope of this piece. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Barry Friedman & Geoffrey R. Stone, Foreword: Testing the Constitution,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (2015).
25. One important criticism of this approach, discussed further in Part IV,
infra, is whether doing so defers to administrators at the expense of legislators.
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modern private law, but appearing in just one portion of the
Fourth Amendment, has come to define so much of American
constitutional law.
I. THREE DIMENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REASONABLENESS
This Article discusses three dimensions of constitutional
reasonableness standards. Each can characterize common law
doctrine as well, but less frequently. Common law doctrines, say,
of negligence, are often far less ornate than multi-part constitutional tests. First, conceptions of reasonableness can be objective, subjective, utility-based, or custom-based—and some rights
include mixed concepts, or more than one usage, side by side
with another, in a compound standard. Second, the objects of
reasonableness standards may be institutional or individualized, and assessed from the perspective of judges, officials, legislators, or citizens—or again, with compound standards that look
to multiple perspectives in order to resolve a single rights claim.
Third, the standard may apply to a right, or to assertion of defenses, or waivers, or remedial limitations, or standards of review. Or it could apply to potentially more than one type of
standard of proof, or for relief on review, potentially blurring the
distinctions between each of these. Thus, each dimension itself
raises complex questions and has its own complex doctrine. This
Part discusses each of the three dimensions in turn.
A. CONCEPTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS
The term reasonable itself has a range of uses and meanings
in everyday language. We speak of reasonable explanations, or
prices, or persons. Something that is reasonable is “not extreme
or excessive”; it is moderate and fair, or it is inexpensive. 26 A
person who is reasonable has “sound judgment” or “the faculty
of reason.” 27 Quantities can be reasonable, people can be reasonable, and interpersonal agreements can be reasonable. In the
law, the term reasonable has that same range of uses, which
track everyday language, but also additional uses that are dis-

26. Reasonable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/reasonable (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
27. Id.
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tinctly legal. Reasonableness standards are pervasive in administrative law, civil procedure, contract law,28 corporate law, 29
criminal law,30 criminal procedure, employment discrimination
law, tort law, and innumerable other fields. 31 In each, reasonableness can be used with conceptions that are, broadly speaking,
objective, subjective, utility-based, or custom-based. As Professor Frédéric G. Sourgens has aptly put it in an in-depth examination, there are “competing utilitarian, pragmatic, or formalist
reasonableness paradigms.” 32
The reasonable person standard is best known from negligence law, where courts have long used it to set an objective
standard based on ordinary care in the relevant circumstances. 33
In tort law, the flexibility of the concept of reasonable care may
be a weakness, but also its strength, giving courts the ability (in
theory, at least) “to arrive at the correct judgment in a fact-dependent context,” even if the concept is “frustratingly imprecise,”
as Professor James Gibson puts it.34 The seemingly simple negligence standard can become quite complex in its different applications and permutations. The classic Judge Hand formula conception of that standard of care adopts a calculus focused on
social utility, based on a balance of the cost of a precaution, as

28. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (“A misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a
reasonable person to manifest his assent . . . .”).
29. Leo Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 671 (2010).
30. Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611
passim (2011).
31. Judges developed reasonableness as “an objective, universally applicable standard by which everyone’s actions could be measured.” CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 98, 316 (1989). See also Stephen M. Feldman,
Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28
BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 316 (2014) (“ Then, from the 1820s to the 1850s, as tort law
gradually separated from contract law, the concept of the reasonable or prudent
man slowly emerged as a generalized standard of care or liability that would
govern interactions among strangers.”).
32. Frédéric G. Sourgens, Right and Reasonableness: The Necessary Diversity of the Common Law, 67 ME. L. REV. 74, 77 (2014).
33. Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 1998) (citing Lanni v. Pa. R.R.
Co., 88 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1952)) (“Negligence is the absence of ordinary care that a
reasonably prudent person would exercise in the same or similar circumstances.”); Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 325.
34. James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1641, 1643 (2008).
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compared to the risk of injury and the size of the harm. 35 However, courts do not always employ such a strictly economic costbenefit analysis. Instead, they often focus on what a reasonably
careful person would do.36 Constitutional balancing does not explicitly adopt utilitarian formulas for assessing liability. Only in
the procedural due process context, in the Mathews v. Eldridge
test for assessing administrative procedures, has the Supreme
Court adopted a utilitarian test for a constitutional right. 37 In
addition, comparative negligence takes into account the reasonableness of not just the tortfeasor, but also the victim.38 Negligence per se standards can import bright-line rules from other
contexts, in deference to legislative judgment, to define per se
unreasonable actions—regardless of whether the legislation
adopts a rule that reflects what a reasonable person might have
otherwise done. 39
In the past, the negligence standard was a reasonable man
standard. More recently, the reasonable man standard has been
replaced by a reasonable person standard, which can reflect the
perspective of those of “like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances,” as the Restatement (Second) of Torts
puts it. 40 Standards of care may be adjusted to reflect different
expectations for minors or the disabled, for example, and not
based on a general utilitarian calculus. Whether courts or fact
35. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(expressing the Hand formula as B < PL, where B is the burden, P is the probability, and L is the injury).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2009). Even better, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965), puts it this way: “ The problem involved may be expressed in homely terms by asking whether ‘the game is
worth the candle.’” See also Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1614 (1997) (comparing the Hand formula to the Golden Rule); Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 902–03 (2001) (“[T]he Reporter intended this definition to have the same meaning as a ‘reasonably careful person’ test. Moreover,
the definition is meant to have some flexibility . . . .”).
37. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
38. Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the
Adoption of Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2007).
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. c; see, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318–19 (2005).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A; accord David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The
Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 17, 20 (1981).
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finders effectively take account of those perspectives is another
question. Common criticisms remain that reasonableness tends
to be interpreted to reflect standards of care that do not reflect
diverse viewpoints, but rather those of reductionist, or majority,
or male viewpoints; a non-emotional perspective; or a privileged
judicial perspective.41
Moreover, in a range of areas, what is reasonable is defined
based on industry standards of care, and not just by a cost-benefit analysis. Thus, in medical malpractice cases, liability may
depend on norms in the relevant medical community: for example, the historical standard of care reflects “such reasonable care
and skill . . . as is usually exercised by physicians or surgeons of
good standing, of the same system or school of practice in the
community in which he resides.” 42 Those standards may not be
sound ones; they may reflect consistent, but shoddy norms. The
doctrine may even perversely disincentivize improvements upon
standards of care.
A negligence-based standard requiring reasonable care is
used in a range of constitutional contexts. Rather than look to a
person of “ordinary prudence,” perhaps informed by standards of
care and accepted custom in a profession,43 constitutional tests
may look to something more uncertain—government standards
of care. 44 In the Fourth Amendment context, for example, police
41. Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable
Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1404
(1992) (“ The male bias inherent in a standard that explicitly excludes consideration of women as reasonable actors is obvious.”); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1177–78 (1990) (“[J]udicial definitions of
reasonableness often reflect the values and assumptions of a narrow elite . . . .”).
42. Hansen v. Pock, 187 P. 282, 284 (Mont. 1920), abrogated by Chapel v.
Allison, 785 P.2d 204, 207 (Mont. 1990). For the current standard of care for
board-certified specialists, see Chapel, 785 P.2d at 207 (“[W]hen a defendant in
a medical negligence action [is] a board-certified specialist, his skill and learning [will] be measured by ‘the skill and learning possessed by other doctors in
good standing, practicing in the same specialty and who hold the same national
board certification.’” (quoting Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 826 (Mont.
1985))). For the current standard of care for non-board-certified specialists, see
Chapel, 785 P.2d at 210 (“[A] non-board-certified general practitioner is held to
the standard of care of a ‘reasonably competent general practitioner acting in
the same or similar community in the United States in the same or similar circumstances.’” (citing Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass’n, 349 A.2d
245 (Md. 1975))).
43. E.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing
the standard focusing on “accepted medical practice” in malpractice suits).
44. WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 32, 173–74 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
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officers are judged on whether they used reasonable force, based
on an objective analysis of the circumstances.45 An officer is not
treated as a reasonable civilian, but as a reasonable police officer
in the circumstances—which raises the question whether one
looks to police practices and norms in law enforcement to inform
the reasonableness analysis.46 Other standards look at reasonable representation by a criminal defense lawyer, or a reasonable
legislator. 47 In other contexts, as I will describe, the Supreme
Court has examined reasonableness from the perspective of a
criminal suspect, 48 a juvenile,49 or an intellectually disabled person.50 Such approaches track negligence law, where the reasonable person may be replaced by the reasonable person of “like
age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances,” as
the Restatement (Second) of Torts puts it. 51
A reasonable person inquiry may also include subjective
considerations. In Equal Protection Clause doctrine under the
Fourteenth Amendment, for example, while rational basis review typically defers to reasonable legislative goals, if a statute
was motivated by a discriminatory purpose or animus, it may be
found unconstitutional. Such a purpose-considering test is, at
least in part, subjective, although the Court often frames it as
unreasonable or irrational to be motivated by animus. Some
Fourth Amendment decisions do not ask what a reasonable police officer would have done, but rather what a reasonable police
officer would have done based specifically on the information the
officer had under the circumstances, which some have termed a
“subjective objectivity.” 52
Contract law does not adopt that utilitarian formulation of
reasonableness; in contract law, a “rational basis ultimately is
measured not by an absolute standard, but by reference to relevant community standards.” 53 Concepts of reasonable reliance,
45. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 399 (1989).
46. For a larger discussion of that question, see Garrett & Stoughton, supra
note 6, at 242–44.
47. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
48. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text.
50. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see
also Seidelson, supra note 40.
52. Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable Is the Reasonable Man?: Police and Excessive Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481, 486
(1994).
53. Sourgens, supra note 32, at 86.
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based on relevant business practices, are designed to assure predictability—a central goal in contract law—and reflect a different rationale than deference to medical practices used in a relevant specialty or community of doctors designed to protect local
professional norms. To be sure, some criticize the use of reasonableness to refer to outside standards of care. Professor John
Gardner argues that reasonableness standards can obscure legal
reasons and that the reasonable person “exists to allow the law
to pass the buck, to help itself pro tempore to standards of justification that are not themselves set by the law.”54 That may be a
relevant criticism for individualized uses of reasonableness
standards in the common law, but not necessarily to either utilitarian or formalistic uses of reasonableness to assess decisions
by the government under constitutional standards that may assess reasonableness given policy and other considerations.
Reasonableness can also refer to an amount of some good,
such as when reasonableness refers to a degree of certainty or of
proof. In harmless-error-type review, a reasonable degree of certainty can refer to certainty that is not more probable than not,
or meeting a preponderance of the evidence standard, but something more than just minimal certainty. The question asks
whether it is reasonably probable that, absent the error, jurors
would have had reasonable doubt concerning guilt. 55 A reasonable probability is perhaps twenty-five percent certainty, or something significant, but not reaching the level of more likely than
not that jurors would have reached a different result at trial.
Similarly, reasonableness can also refer to concepts of proportionality. For example, in the area of civil detention, the Supreme Court asks whether an ongoing civil detention serves a
“reasonable relation to the purpose” justifying the initial commitment. 56 The idea expresses a notion that additional detention
must be proportional to the continuing justification for the detention, and the use of reasonable reflects some modest, but not
overly demanding degree of relation.

54. John Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person, 131 LAW Q.
REV. 563, 568 (2015).
55. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995); see also United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (adopting in the context of Brady v. Maryland
claims a definition of materiality of “reasonable probability” as “a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (adopting that formulation in the context of ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims).
56. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
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Still more complex uses of reasonableness occur in the context of constitutional standards that involve multi-factor balancing tests, discussed further in the Sections that follow. For example, what does one make of the concept of reasonableness at
work in a constitutional case like Kyllo v. United States, regarding government use of thermal imaging technology on a person’s
home? 57 Fourth Amendment scholars have intensely debated
how to conceptualize what reasonableness means in such a
case.58 There, the Supreme Court discussed reasonable minimum expectations of privacy, emphasizing the sanctity of the
home,59 as balanced against government interests. The Court
also considered other factors, such as whether technology is in
“general public use” and available to the public, 60 as well as some
common law baseline level of personal privacy, “that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted,” and should be unaltered by new technology. 61 This Fourth Amendment test looks
more like constitutional balancing of individual and government
interests, taking into account a range of factors, and is perhaps
less focused on an individual person’s expectation of privacy than
prior rulings. Calling this a reasonableness analysis makes
sense, due to the Fourth Amendment text, but the analysis looks
much like other constitutional balancing tests. In other Fourth
Amendment rulings, the Court has long used, adopting Justice
Harlan’s formulation in Katz, a test focusing on both the individual and society; asking whether the personal interest in privacy
is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 62
Professor Sourgens terms this a formalist paradigm, in which
judges decide what is reasonable given a balancing of relevant
57. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
58. See, e.g., Robert S. Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Information Age,
126 YALE L.J. F. 8 (2016); Richard Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance of Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013
(2001); David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law,
72 MISS. L.J. 143, 148 n.13 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms
and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1425 n.146 (2002).
59. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 34 (describing rule adopted as one that “assures preservation of
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted”).
62. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (adopting Harlan’s formulation from
Katz). For a discussion of reasonable privacy interests, see also Orin S. Kerr, An
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV.
476, 516–17 (2011).
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interests, such as balancing law enforcement and personal privacy interests, or even, as in Kyllo, taking into account some
common law baseline level of protection.63 It again is perhaps
better thought of as reasonableness standing in for constitutional balancing of the type performed in a range of constitutional settings. Calling the balance between individual rights
and social interests, as against law enforcement interests, a balance seeking a reasonable rule may be simply using the word
reasonable to describe constitutional balancing.
B. OBJECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS
A constitutional right can be violated by federal, state, and
local actors, including (1) legislators enacting statutes; (2) executive officials enforcing them through actions and regulations;
and (3) judges issuing judgments.64 A standard of constitutional
reasonableness may refer to different government actors—and
one purpose of these doctrines can be to assign responsibility for
implementing constitutional rights to different actors. In complex areas, like constitutional criminal procedure, where a wide
range of different actors all work on investigations and trials,
assigning such responsibility can be a challenging matter. Moreover, sometimes the constitutional standard views reasonableness not from the perspective of the government actor, but rather
from the perspective of the citizen whose rights were allegedly
violated.
The objects of constitutional reasonableness may be aggregate and not individual. In some situations, the court looks at
the question of reasonableness based on an institutional perspective, looking broadly to the interests of a government entity or
actor. Or, the court may look systemically at what is reasonable
regarding the effects of government action on citizens, in general, and not the individual person bringing the case. As a result,
some constitutional rights lend themselves to an aggregate or
systemic inquiry, while other constitutional rights are more narrowly individualized, or focused on case-specific circumstances. 65
The differences among these choices may reflect important
differences in views concerning the goals of constitutional rights.
63. 533 U.S. at 34.
64. For a lucid discussion of the various objections of constitutional provisions generally, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011).
65. Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 593 (2012).
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If the main goal is to protect individual rights, then the perspective of an individual would be more important. If the main goal
is to protect aggregate rights in society, then an aggregate, but
citizen-focused perspective, may be appropriate. If the main goal
is to balance individual versus government priorities, then perhaps both perspectives are useful. If the main goal is to regulate
or deter government, then perhaps the perspective of government actors is the best perspective to adopt. None of this analysis is to say that any one perspective is the best one for courts to
adopt.
However, these are choices that must be made, and typically, the constitutional text does not specify to which objects the
right applies. Sometimes, it is not clear what the right answer is
to the question of which actor should be regulated by the constitutional right. The concept of reasonableness can then stand in
for a set of decisions regarding who is regulated by the constitutional right, and yet the term reasonableness does not itself say
which perspective should matter.
The Fourth Amendment, for example, states: “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.” 66 While it was understood to apply, before enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment and incorporation, only to federal
officials, that does not resolve whether the reasonableness of the
search should be assessed based on the perspective of the police
officer, or the person being searched, or perhaps a judge deciding
whether to authorize a search or to admit the evidence. As a result, some constitutional tests under the Fourth Amendment refer to the reasonableness of a seizure, judged from the perspective of an objective police officer. Other tests assess
reasonableness from a broader social perspective. The courts
sometimes act as if reasonableness logically tells one who should
be regulated. Since courts adopt very different reasonableness
tests in the Fourth Amendment context, there must be some external feature of the purpose the right is serving that provides
the answer to the question.
Sometimes waivers of individual constitutional rights are
assessed from the perspective of an individual. As the D.C. Circuit put it in the context of a criminal defendant’s guilty plea:
[W]e do not think it is a sufficient reason . . . that appellants may in
fact have labored under a subjective impression. . . . In our view, the

66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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proper question . . . is . . . whether this belief was, in an objective sense,
reasonable in the circumstances. 67

Yet what if the prosecutors withheld evidence or coerced the defendant in some way; should a court ask whether a reasonable
prosecutor would have engaged in those actions? Instead, the focus is on a reasonable defendant (and not on this defendant, except to the extent that courts sometimes consider whether a vulnerable individual or juvenile would have been more likely to
involuntarily plead guilty). Perhaps, for a question of waiver, the
focus should be on the individual person, and not the government. Doing so is a choice, and the choice of an objective standard, with just the defendant as the object, may absolve the government from constitutional responsibility.
Perhaps one virtue of reasonableness is that it permits shifting choices concerning from whose perspective the right is to be
assessed. Calling it a reasonableness standard, however, does
not answer the question to whom the standard applies. Thus,
courts should have to do more work to justify the choice of a particular object of constitutional reasonableness.
C. RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS
Reasonableness has migrated from standards for constitutional rights to standards for assessing whether a constitutional
violation deserves a remedy. Now, just as there is a choice to be
made regarding from which perspective a right should be assessed, there is nothing necessarily wrong with thinking separately about how to define a right and how to define the conditions under which a particular remedy may be appropriate.
What has been surprising, however, has been the extent to which
those distinctions have been blended. For example, the Supreme
Court has said that the immunity of officials under § 1983 should
be assessed under an objective reasonableness test. 68 Such a
standard had its origins in the Screws decision—in a rule of lenity defense against criminal liability—but this standard then migrated to become a defense against civil liability, and a condition
for obtaining relief for violations of constitutional rights more
generally.69 The Court had earlier adopted a partially subjective
67. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 224 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1013 (1975).
68. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
69. An intent requirement, not a reasonableness requirement, applies in
criminal actions concerning constitutional violations. In Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945), a plurality of the Court found 18 U.S.C. § 242,
a statute making it a crime to “willfully” and “under color of any law” deprive a

2017]

CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS

79

test, but ultimately concluded that an objective test was preferable. That objective reasonableness test then became the default
standard for not only civil rights litigation under § 1983, but
criminal prosecutions for violations of constitutional rights,
harmless error review of constitutional errors during appeals,
and post-conviction review of constitutional error using federal
habeas corpus. Reasonableness now limits constitutional remedies across the full spectrum of constitutional litigation.
The standard governing liability under § 1983—the statute
under which much of modern constitutional litigation is
brought—is a reasonableness standard.70 Indeed, during the
1980s, when the Court was moving Fourth Amendment use-offorce law from a subjective to an objective standard, the Court
made the same moves in its interpretation of § 1983. Initially,
the Court adopted a mixed standard that was both subjective
and objective, insulating officers from civil rights liability under
a standard of qualified immunity. 71 Section 1983 does not have
any reasonableness requirement in its text.72 Yet the Court said
that it would interpret the statute “in harmony with general
principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.” 73 Where did it turn for a tort principle immunizing officials from constitutional tort liability? The doctrine of
constitutional reasonableness, of course. The notion of reasonableness was attractive to the Court not merely because it imposes sound standards of care but also because it is a mixed question of law and fact, which judges can use at summary judgment
to avoid a trial. 74
In 1982, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court rejected a subjective approach in which officers would benefit from a subjective
good-faith defense, in combination with an objective standard requiring respect for constitutional rights, and changed course,
adopting a two-part reasonableness standard.75 The Court held
that officers are immune from suit so long as their conduct was
person of their constitutional rights, required that the defendant intend to violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.
70. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
71. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); see also Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
73. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).
74. Regarding judicial interest in rational remedies, see Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J.
1 (2015).
75. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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(1) “objective[ly] reasonable[]”; and (2) “does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”76 No longer could plaintiffs allege official “malice” and proceed to trial. In Harlow, the Court
emphasized that “[r]eliance on the objective reasonableness of
an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary
judgment.” 77 A subjective standard resulted in a factual inquiry,
which many judges sensibly thought was inherently a jury question. An objective reasonableness standard permitted more judicial control over constitutional litigation, meaning fewer civil
rights cases would go to trial. The Justices supplied additional
reasons supporting the shift, including that a subjective inquiry
permitted examination of the “subjective motivation” of officials,
which may “entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of
numerous persons,” which itself would be “peculiarly disruptive
of effective government.” 78
The second prong of the standard resembles more of a negligence-type duty of care, but focuses on standards of care that
come from federal judges. The Court has explained the noticerelated reasons for the shift to an objective standard concerning
what constitutional law was clearly established by the federal
courts at the time of the event: qualified immunity seeks to ensure that defendants “reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability.”79 Thus, the Court explained that
for liability to accrue, “[t]he contours of the right [violated are]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.” 80 That places officers
in the position of having to follow developments in the federal
courts concerning constitutional law—these are not community
standards of care or industry standards of care, but rather federal judicial standards, based on constitutional case law.
Later the Court adopted this same civil reasonableness
standard in the context for criminal prosecution for civil rights
violations—in which there is a subjective, intent standard—
holding that whether the conduct violated clearly established
constitutional law would be assessed under a reasonableness
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
Id.
Id. at 817.
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984).
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
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standard.81 Reasonableness has spread farther into the law of
constitutional remedies in criminal procedure. The concept of
“objective reasonableness” was also adopted by the Supreme
Court in additional Fourth Amendment decisions that limit access to the exclusionary remedy at trial, based on a concept of
reasonableness, apart from whether the search or seizure was
itself reasonable.82
The Supreme Court then adopted a reasonableness standard, modeled on the second part of the qualified immunity test,
for all federal habeas litigation in Teague v. Lane, ruling that
habeas litigants should not be able to assert new rights not in
place at the time that the state judges denied them relief on their
constitutional claims.83 The Court interpreted that standard as
requiring deference to “reasonable, good-faith interpretations” of
the law by state courts.84 Several Justices had argued that the
standard should be that a federal court would ask whether “reasonable jurists” would agree with the result reached by the state
judges, including not just which law was to be applied, but
whether the state judges reasonably applied the law to the facts
of the case.85 Justice Clarence Thomas prominently, but unsuccessfully, advocated for a “patently unreasonable” standard. 86
Once again, the attractiveness of a reasonableness standard was
to empower federal judges to deny relief on a broader range of
legal, as well as factual, questions. The Supreme Court never
reached that question because Congress then incorporated a version of such a standard, using language explicitly drawn from
the qualified immunity context, when drafting the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996. AEDPA
adopted a standard of review for all federal habeas corpus challenges that relief may only be awarded if the state judge denied

81. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997).
82. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011) (“[S]earches conducted
in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject
to the exclusionary rule.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1983)
(“[R]eliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate . . . should be admissible in the
prosecution’s case . . . .”).
83. 489 U.S. 288, 289 (1989).
84. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990).
85. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 290–91 (1992).
86. Id. at 291 (“In other words, a federal habeas court ‘must defer to the
state court’s decision rejecting the claim unless that decision is patently unreasonable.’”).
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relief in a manner that was an “unreasonable” application of
“clearly established” Supreme Court law. 87
The use of reasonableness in that context raised novel questions because, while reasonableness has been used to describe a
standard of care by persons, it was not an accepted standard of
review. Justice John Paul Stevens noted in his opinion in Williams v. Taylor, the landmark decision interpreting the AEDPA
standard, that this text “does not obviously prescribe a specific,
recognizable standard of review,” using familiar terms such as
“de novo” or “plain error.” 88 Instead, Congress used the term reasonableness. What does it mean to get the Constitution wrong,
to erroneously deny relief to someone convicted due to a constitutional violation, and do so in a wrong-but-reasonable way?
Courts have struggled with that question ever since Congress
adopted the statute. In Williams, the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, rejected a somewhat circular formulation by the Fourth Circuit that a state judge could
only get it sufficiently wrong if rejecting the constitutional claim
“in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable.” 89 This, Justice O’Connor noted, risked turning the inquiry into a “subjective inquiry rather than . . . an objective one.”
Indeed, some courts had said that since an appellate panel had
split, then of course reasonable judges could disagree. 90 Justice
O’Connor noted that “[t]he term ‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to define.” 91 However, “[t]hat said, it is a common term in
the legal world, and accordingly, federal judges are familiar with
its meaning.” 92 It would mean that the state court must do more
than decide federal law incorrectly, but rather unreasonably.
The Court did not say more to explain what increment beyond
being incorrect made a state court decision incorrect and also
unreasonable.
87. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). That provision states that a petition “shall not be granted,” if
the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
(2012).
88. 529 U.S. 362, 385 (2000).
89. Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 529 U.S. 362
(2000).
90. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 (citing Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769
(5th Cir. 1996)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Going still farther, the Court held in Fry v. Pliler that a federal court must also examine whether a state court’s determination that error was harmless was itself unreasonable. 93 Yet Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, noted that the result
of adding that reasonableness deference was no different than
the Brecht harmless error test asking whether error reasonably
contributed to the outcome. 94 There was no need to further
“stack” reasonableness deference on top of deference, and apply
both tests (AEDPA deference and Brecht), when “the latter obviously subsumes the former.” 95
Constitutional reasonableness had come full circle. An objective reasonableness standard, designed perhaps initially with
the Fourth Amendment and police use of force in mind, became
the governing standard for all of § 1983 liability; it then migrated into substantive criminal law interpretation; it was incorporated into underlying criminal procedure rights; and it was
adopted by the Court in the habeas context—but then, in turn,
adopted in the text of the federal habeas statute by Congress.
Yet, the Supreme Court has kept hold of the reins. The
Court has stealthily moved away in recent years from an objective reasonableness standard in federal habeas corpus, and increasingly cited to what reasonable jurists might do, raising the
specter of the very sort of subjective analysis that the Court
soundly rejected as unworkable in Williams v. Taylor. 96 In Harrington v. Richter, without having been briefed on the issue and
without claiming to announce a new standard, the Court described the AEDPA unreasonableness standard as one that required deference to state rulings “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement,” and asked whether “fairminded jurists
could disagree.” 97 The Court has added to the term “unreasonable” a gloss regarding “fairminded jurists.” 98 Still more rulings
suggest that a court must examine the actual reasons provided
by a court, and not hypothetical reasons (as in rational basis review of legislation). 99 The implication of these recent statements

93. 551 U.S. 112, 120 (2007).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
97. 562 U.S. 86, 101–03 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.
652, 664 (2004)).
98. Id.
99. Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005) (per curiam).
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is that jurists need not just be reasonable, and certainly not correct in their constitutional rulings, but just fairminded. 100 The
Justices encourage the lower federal judges to defer to their state
court colleagues, with faint praise. 101
Constitutional reasonableness in criminal procedure goes
still deeper into standards that control whether an inmate can
obtain a remedy. The Supreme Court has said that constitutional errors in criminal trials must be reviewed in federal habeas corpus based on a constitutionally required harmless-error
standard that asks whether the error reasonably affected the
outcome at trial (or, conversely, lacked a “substantial and injurious effect”). 102 Of course, that review is layered over the underlying standard of proof at trial, at which a juror must apply a
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. The layers of reasonableness review run deep—it is reasonableness all the way down.
II. NAVIGATING CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS
DOCTRINE
In this Part, I show in more detail how these three dimensions can operate across a few key areas that illustrate well the
complexity of constitutional reasonableness doctrines. First, I
discuss rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause
in particular. Second, I discuss constitutional criminal procedure
rights, in which approaches differ sharply between certain Due
Process Clause rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well
as Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment rights.

100. For criticism, see Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI.
L. REV. 519, 540 (2014) (“Richter not only made a striking change to habeas
practice based on a statutory interpretation of a fifteen-year-old law that had
been consistently interpreted otherwise by lower courts—it also did so sua
sponte.”); Amy Knight Burns, Note, Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive
Error in the Analysis of AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV. 203, 220–21 (2013).
101. Huq, supra note 100, at 539 (“Habeas denial rates may be so high already that Richter ’s impact will be inframarginal. Nevertheless, there are early
signs that at least lower court judges are heeding Richter ’s new verbal formulation.”).
102. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)) (establishing separate federal habeas
harmless-error standards limiting relief to where the constitutional error had a
“substantial and injurious effect,” or when no “actual prejudice” resulted). The
Court had previously defined “prejudice” as a “reasonable probability” that an
error affected the outcome. See id.
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A. RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
For a broad range of constitutional rights, the Supreme
Court uses the rational basis test, which is deferential to legislative or executive action, absent some reason for heightened or
strict scrutiny. The standard is not based on any particular constitutional text.103 Instead, the test adopts a view of judicial review and restraint, designed to defer to the broad range of goals
of government action, rather than a standard designed to promote adherence to reasonable standards of care. Early cases emphasized whether legislation was supported by “reasonable
grounds” and assessed state laws for their reasonableness in legislating regarding the general welfare.104 Most infamous of those
cases was the Supreme Court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, sustaining a Louisiana law requiring race segregation in railway
passenger cars as a reasonable exercise of the police power. 105
The standard has evolved into one of rational basis review, in
which a range of constitutional rights receive deferential review,
unless there is evidence that triggers stricter scrutiny of government action. Such review is often considered to generally be
toothless and “highly deferential.” 106
As Professor Richard Fallon explains: “As a doctrinal matter, the Court frequently treats reasonable disagreement as a
ground for judicial deference to the political branches of government.” 107 The Court has often stated, in explaining such standards, that considering government motives and subjective intent
is fraught. In United States v. O’Brien, for example, the Court
noted that: “[i]nquiries into congressional motives or purposes
are a hazardous matter.”108
Such rational basis review is commonly used to review equal
protection challenges, but also challenges under the Due Process

103. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA.
L. REV. 1627, 1630 (2016) (“ There is no textual basis in the Constitution to justify reviewing legislation for its rationality.”).
104. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898) (stating that lawmakers had
“reasonable grounds for believing that [their] determination is supported by the
facts”).
105. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
106. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1689, 1713 (1984).
107. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 58 (1997).
108. 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
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Clause 109 and other constitutional rights, such as First Amendment claims directed at unprotected speech or conduct, 110 and
structural claims, such as Spending Clause claims examining
the reasonable relationship between a condition and the expenditure in federal spending legislation. 111
When conducting such review, “the theory of rational-basis
review . . . does not require the State to place any evidence in the
record.” 112 Legislators need not “actually articulate at any time”
the purpose of its classification.113 Instead, hypothetical bases
for the legislation may suffice and the legislation “must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification.” 114 This, as Professor Thomas Nachbar has recently critiqued, consists of a highly deferential and not particularly rigorous standard for rationality.115 Such review consists of
an objective reasonableness test for legislators, taken collectively, or for other government actors facing a discrimination
109. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (applying rational basis
review to anti-sodomy statute); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768 (1975)
(quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960)) (“Particularly when we
deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program such as [Social Security], we must recognize that the Due Process Clause
can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.”).
110. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 406 (1992) (White, J., concurring); e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973) (“It is not for
us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the
exceptional case where that legislation plainly impinges upon rights protected
by the Constitution itself.”).
111. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987) (“Congress conditioned
the receipt of federal funds in a way reasonably calculated to address this particular impediment to a purpose for which the funds are expended.”); Ivanhoe
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (“[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof.”).
112. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
113. Id. at 320 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992)).
114. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see also
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1960) (“[L]egislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”).
115. See Nachbar, supra note 103. For additional criticism of the test, see
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 490 (2004)
(stating that rational basis review’s “emphasis on deference at times leads
courts to skip over the required step of evaluating the link between that permissible goal and the government’s action”); see also Neelum J. Wadhwani,
Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 802 (2006).
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challenge, or other constitutional challenge where heightened
scrutiny does not apply. Moreover, lawmakers may rely on “unprovable assumptions” that “underlie much lawful state regulation of commercial and business affairs.”116
Like in other areas of reasonableness review, a seemingly
“uncontroversial appeal of rationality” permits a broadly deferential doctrine that nevertheless may change over time and permit judicial intervention, without clear, binding rules. 117 Thus,
although it is nominally an objective analysis, the Supreme
Court has had a long tradition of considering subjective motives,
even when rational basis review might otherwise apply. In equal
protection cases, the Supreme Court has said that a purpose to
discriminate must be shown when strict scrutiny applies—“the
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.” 118 The Court has also sometimes put it differently, as in
Grutter, explaining that “[w]e apply strict scrutiny to all racial
classifications to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”119 In that approach, the goal
of strict scrutiny is to uncover whether the government used a
discriminatory purpose. In contrast, while rational basis review
is broadly deferential to the range of goals legislators may have
sought, in some cases subjective motive matters. USDA v.
Moreno emphasized that the “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” 120 In Romer v. Evans, the Court found government action impermissible even under rational basis review, if
there is a showing of animus or discriminatory intent.121 Such
cases, called by commentators as examples of “rational basis

116. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973).
117. Nachbar, supra note 103, at 1631.
118. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). For criticism, see, for
example, David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 952 (1989).
119. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
120. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985) (holding that a bare desire to harm a politically
unpopular group is not a legitimate state interest).
121. E.g., 517 U.S. 620, 632, 634 (finding a Colorado Constitutional Amendment “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”).
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with bite,” 122 may reflect a bar on legislators expressing “naked
preferences” for one interest group over another, as Professor
Cass Sunstein has put it.123 In recent years, the Court has been
tempted to engage in subjective analysis in another set of rational basis cases—cases that do not involve animus directed at
any particular group, but rather single plaintiffs complaining of
arbitrary treatment. In its “class of one” cases like Willowbrook
v. Olech, the Court has held that the plaintiff may claim that he
“has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.” 124
In Lawrence v. Texas,125 United States v. Windsor,126 and
most recently, Obergefell v. Hodges, 127 the Court did not state
whether its approach consisted of a rational basis review. Rather
than using a reasonable legislator standard, the Court instead
recognized a fundamental right and found that the Constitution
“does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite
sex.” 128 The central focus in Lawrence and Windsor, in particular, was animus and discriminatory purpose; in Lawrence the
122. Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 673 (3d ed. 2006) (“ The
claim is that in some cases where the Court says that it is using rational basis
review, it is actually employing a test with more ‘bite’ than the customarily very
deferential rational basis review.”); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1972); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124
HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) (“[A]pplications [of rational basis in Moreno,
Cleburne, and Romer] depart from the usual deference associated with rational
basis review. For this reason, commentators have correctly discerned a new rational basis with bite standard in such cases.”).
123. Sunstein, supra note 106, at 1730.
124. 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553
U.S. 591, 591–92 (2008) (holding that while a class-of-one equal protection claim
can sometimes be sustained, the class-of-one theory does not apply in the public
employment context).
125. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (concerning a Texas law prohibiting same-sex intimate conduct).
126. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (concerning federal estate-tax treatment of a
same-sex spouse).
127. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (concerning the right of same-sex couples to
marry); see Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex
Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 782 (2013).
128. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2591, 2607. The Court added that there is “no
lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State.” It was Justice O’Connor in a concurring opinion that
invoked rational basis review: “When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a
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Court emphasized that an anti-sodomy statute “furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.” 129 As a result, perhaps, the dissenters in Obergefell did not argue that the appropriate standard of review should be rational basis review, nor
that the motives of the legislators did not matter. Rather, they
contested whether a right to same-sex marriage was appropriately deeply rooted, or deserved recognition as a fundamental
right, or whether the traditional understanding of marriage
should govern. 130
Similarly, in the First Amendment area, despite the language in O’Brien counseling against inquiries into motive, the
Court sometimes applies the Lemon test, asking whether a statute has a “secular legislative purpose,” and whether it “neither
advances nor inhibits religion” or fosters “excessive government
entanglement with religion.” 131 That well-known three-part test
looks at the form and function of a statute, but also its purpose
or intent. 132 The Lemon test has never been overruled, but it is
far from consistently applied; as Justice Antonin Scalia put it:
“[W]hen we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely . . . . Sometimes, we take a middle course, calling its three
prongs ‘no more than helpful signposts.’” He added that, like a
“ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad,” the test persists; “Such a docile and
useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent
state; one never knows when one might need him.” 133
Justice William Rehnquist once wrote in an opinion that
“[t]he most arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all . . .
cases applied a uniform or consistent [rational basis] test under

politically unpopular group, [the Court has] applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection
Clause.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
129. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constructionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367 (2014).
130. 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
131. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (calling inquiry into “congressional motives or purposes
. . . a hazardous matter.”).
132. For a case relying on the purpose prong, see, for example, Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
133. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398–99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741 (1973)).
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equal protection principles.” 134 Is the inconsistent use of an objective, as opposed to a subjective, rational basis test a symptom?
Or just something to be expected in areas in which such reasonableness standards apply? The same can be said of intent tests
more broadly: objective reasonableness standards may be honored as much in the breach as not, but they are useful tools to
retain alongside subjective intent or purpose tests. They are useful in the flexibility that they offer to judges, but they do not provide clear notice to government actors or the public. Perhaps
more clarity would exist if the Court more clearly explained what
types of actions are per se irrational, or adopted approaches demanding particular types of evidence of unreasonableness. 135
Just as tort law developed certain types of negligence per se,
providing brighter-line examples of unreasonable behavior, 136
constitutional courts could provide further explanations of what
types of conduct, or what types of information, support a conclusion that government action is per se unreasonable or irrational
under rational basis review. The language in Lawrence regarding animus and identifying evidence concerning legislation that
“furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual” can be
seen as at least a step in that direction.137
Another area in which reasonableness review is at least informed by community practice and tested standards is in First
Amendment public forum doctrine, in which “time, place, or
manner” restrictions on speech may be reasonable if narrowly
tailored and with “ample alternative channels” provided.138 The
reasonableness of the time, place, or manner restrictions is assessed based on “the nature of a place” and “the pattern of its
normal activities,” and is therefore at least somewhat evidencebased.139 What is practical, given prior practice; local government; the community; and what alternative avenues for speech

134. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980).
135. Professor Nachbar describes early cases that adopted a view grounded
in the police power, defining certain subjects for acceptable regulation. Nachbar,
supra note 103, at Part I. Such substantive review is itself highly problematic,
and Nachbar instead recommends requiring clear statement rules describing
actual basis for legislation. Id. at 1689.
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
137. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
138. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
139. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
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remain open, can all be assessed. 140 Perhaps for those reasons,
the doctrine has been very little criticized. 141 As I will develop
more in Part III, concepts of reasonableness more closely anchored to industry practice, community norms, or empirical evidence of effectiveness may prove far more defensible than standards developed solely by judges to reflect what judges think is
reasonable.
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REASONABLENESS
In constitutional criminal procedure, whose perspective is
adopted as that of the reasonable actor matters—that of a citizen; of a criminal suspect; of a police officer; or a juror; or a defense lawyer; or a judge? Each of these apply, and sometimes
more than one of these perspectives matter. The differences typically relate to whether the focus is on individual rights or on
deterrence of government actors. Sometimes both matter and
both are kept in loose focus. Professor Kit Kinports points out
how “the Court tends to shift opportunistically from case to case
between subjective and objective standards and between whose
point of view—the police officer’s or the defendant’s—it considers controlling.” 142 The Due Process Clause regulates criminal
trials, adopting the perspective of jurors when it demands that
they be instructed to find guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but
at other times reflecting the perspective of defense lawyers and
prosecutors that are being regulated. In Fourth Amendment rulings, the focus is on police behavior and deterring overreaching
searches and seizures, so the Supreme Court focuses on whether
police action was reasonable, as well as on individual rights. In
contrast, in some of its Fifth Amendment rulings, the Court focuses on the suspect as the relevant reasonable person—who
may feel they are in police custody while being questioned, even

140. Id.
141. C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 937
(1984) (describing the test as “possibly the most universally accepted tenet of
first amendment doctrine”); see also Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1305 (2005).
142. For an important discussion of this general problem in criminal procedure, see Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 71, 74 (2007).
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if not formally under arrest. 143 Sixth Amendment (and due process) ineffective assistance of counsel rulings focus on two distinct forms of reasonableness: that of a reasonable lawyer, based
on professional standards, and that of reasonable jurors and
whether the outcome at trial might have been prejudiced. 144
That standard creates the possibility of “doubly deferential” review, with not just the two forms of reasonableness used to decide whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel, but also
whether relief is warranted, based on the AEDPA standard of
review limiting relief unless the state judge was unreasonable in
dismissing the Sixth Amendment claim. 145 Reasonableness is
piled on top of reasonableness like a layer cake—and this Section
explores how constitutional criminal procedure has become shot
through with varying and inconsistent reasonableness inquiries.
They have a common purpose—to limit remedies for a wide
range of constitutional rights—as well as to assign responsibility
to a range of different criminal justice actors.
These differing tests can reflect difficult choices regarding
the purpose of constitutional criminal procedure: Is the goal to
protect individual rights, deter and regulate government actors,
or both? Those shifting and sometimes inconsistent priorities in
constitutional criminal procedure writ large then become instantiated through reasonableness tests.
1. Due Process Clause
In criminal procedure rulings concerning the due process
clause, fair trial rights do not primarily take the perspective of
the individual guaranteed the right to a fair trial, but rather a
series of actors being regulated by the due process right in question. The Supreme Court has held that a jury must be instructed
that it may only find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However,
when the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed, the evidence is
assessed from the prosecutor’s perspective, giving the prosecution the benefit of all inferences in favor of their evidence.146 During federal habeas corpus, a miscarriage-of-justice standard that
143. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) (holding that “custody
must be determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation
would perceive his circumstances,” but a suspect’s age or experience is not relevant to the analysis).
144. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
145. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013).
146. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (“[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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can excuse procedural bars applies, and it adopts a preponderance standard directed at federal judges, asking whether “it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 147 The federal
judge must make “a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do,” looking at not just
the evidence at the original criminal trial but also newly discovered evidence, all viewed “holistically” together. 148 In dissent in
House v. Bell, Chief Justice John Roberts would have reformulated the standard and denied relief, so long as “at least one juror, acting reasonably, would vote to convict.” 149 To be sure, some
due process rules in criminal procedure do not take account of a
government perspective. For example, when considering a denial
of defendant’s counsel of choice, or of a public trial, a court does
not ask whether the violation was reasonable from either the
government or defendant’s perspective, but rather treats the violation as a per se structural error. 150 Most due process rules,
though, use reasonableness designed to accomplish regulatory
goals, with less focus on the individual.
2. Fourth Amendment
As noted, in a range of rulings, the Court has long used a
broad test, focusing on balancing both the individual privacy interest and the larger interest of society against law enforcement
interests, asking whether the personal interest in privacy is “one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 151 Such a
test is objective, but focused on the individual, law enforcement,
and society. Other Fourth Amendment rules select different concepts of reasonableness and different objects. In the use of force
context, the Court held in Graham v. Connor that the inquiry is
an objective-reasonableness standard, focused on the perspective of the police officer, not that of the citizen. 152 While the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
147. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
148. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at
329).
149. Id. at 572 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
150. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).
151. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (adopting Harlan’s formulation from Katz); for discussion, see Kerr, supra note 62, at 516–17.
152. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (“[S]ubjective motivations
of the individual officers . . . [have] no bearing on whether a particular seizure
is ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.”).
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standard is ostensibly objective, it is limited to some degree to
the time period when force was used, and based on the information available to the officer, with the Court emphasizing that
the “calculus of reasonableness” should “embody allowance for
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments[] in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” 153
In other respects, the Court has highlighted that an officer
must, for example, face an “immediate threat” to their safety,
but that much-quoted formulation does not reflect what a reasonable officer would do, based on training and best practices.
More recent rulings, such as Scott v. Harris, 154 Brosseau v.
Haugen,155 and Mullenix v. Luna, 156 fail to discuss or reject the
relevance of sound police policy and training, instead highlighting how the result “depends very much on the facts of each
case.” 157 As Seth Stoughton and I have described elsewhere, the
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment incorrectly constrains the use of police tactics to inform the reasonableness inquiry.158 Instead, the focus should be taken from the individual
officer, and placed, at the department level, on sound policy and
training.159 State tort law takes a different approach, focusing
on general standards of care. Rules limiting liability for assault
do not define reasonableness based on any particular moment in
time; the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopts a rule of necessity, such that deadly force can only be used “when it reasonably
appears” to the officer “that there is no other alternative” means
available, short of abandoning the arrest.160
Indeed, in other Fourth Amendment contexts, the Court
adopts a standard of care attempting to reflect sound policy and
153. Id. at 396–97.
154. 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“Although respondent’s attempt to craft an
easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the
end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”).
155. 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
156. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198) (holding a reasonableness inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the
case, not as a broad general proposition”).
157. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201.
158. Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 6.
159. The structure of § 1983 doctrine, as well as the interpretation of the
reasonableness of force, results in the focus on individual officers and not policy
and training, as described in Garrett & Stroughton, supra note 6, Part I.A.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 131 cmt. F (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(noting that deadly force “is privileged only as a last resort”).
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training. In United States v. Leon, the Court posed the question
whether a “reasonably well trained police officer could have believed that there existed probable cause to search [defendant’s]
house.” 161 To provide impetus, the Court cited to Professor Jerold
Israel’s discussion of the goals of such constitutional standards
of care: to “make officers aware of the limits imposed by the
[F]ourth [A]mendment and emphasize the need to operate
within those limits.” 162
In still other contexts, it is the objective perspective of the
individual defendant that is important. A person is seized if a
reasonable person would not feel “free to leave.” 163 A person’s
reasonable “expectation of privacy” matters. 164 Yet, according to
the Court, whether a person is seized also depends on the subjective intent of the officer, since an accidental police action is
not a seizure.165 The Court also adopts a (partially) subjective
test for consent and waiver of rights, where the voluntariness of
a waiver is assessed based on factors including the “possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents,” such as
whether the person is disabled. 166 If the officer misperceives
whether the person consented to a search, however, then the test
is objective, from the perspective of the officer, making both objective and subjective consent of the citizen largely irrelevant. 167
161. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
162. Id. at 919 n.20 (quoting Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the
Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1412–
13 (1977)).
163. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 502 (1983); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“ The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment
is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person
have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”).
164. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
165. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989) (“[A] Fourth
Amendment seizure . . . [occurs] only when there is a governmental termination
of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.”).
166. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229, 248 (1973); see also
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (holding that the respondent’s age, educational attainment, gender, and ethnicity were relevant but
not decisive in finding that she voluntarily consented to accompany officers to
the DEA office).
167. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (holding a warrantless
entry is valid based upon consent from someone whom the police reasonably,
though mistakenly, believe possesses common authority over the premises);
Bruce A. Green, “Power, Not Reason”: Justice Marshall’s Valedictory and the
Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court’s 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REV. 373, 383
(1992) (discussing how Jimeno equated “reasonableness” of a consensual search
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The objective perspective of the officer trumps all other considerations.
One gets the impression that the Court picks and chooses
concepts of reasonableness—subjective or objective (dimension
one) and the individual or systematic perspective from which it
is assessed (dimension two)—in order to micro-calibrate Fourth
Amendment coverage, to make it very difficult for individuals to
know whether a search or seizure is unreasonable or to litigate
the question, and to maximize the discretion of police officers.
Still other Fourth Amendment tests steer back and forth
from the objective and the subjective. The standard for police use
of force is defined as an objective test, focusing on the perspective
of a reasonable police officer. Yet the Court also asks what a reasonable officer would have done based on the information that
this particular officer had under the circumstances, a somewhat
subjective objectivity, since a reasonable professional may have
acted quite differently under the circumstances. 168
While the main thrust of its rulings in the past two decades
has been to move towards more objective reasonableness tests,
recently the Supreme Court has uncharacteristically slipped
back into partially subjective Fourth Amendment tests; recognizing, for example, a good-faith exception for a police officer’s
reasonable reliance on a warrant (even if issued erroneously). 169
That standard takes into account individual decisions of the police officer, even if they would not be reasonable, absent the goodfaith errors.170 Whether a police officer has probable cause or
reasonable suspicion is similarly viewed from the perspective of
a reasonable police officer. 171 In that context, however, the Court
has slid towards the subjective, stating that the experience of
to the “reasonableness” of the police officer ’s perspective in believing that the
suspect consented).
168. Alpert & Smith, supra note 52.
169. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
170. See id. at 923.
171. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276 (2002) (stating that an officer
is “entitled to make an assessment of the situation in light of his specialized
training and familiarity with the customs of the area’s inhabitants”); United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“[A] trained officer draws inferences
and makes deductions . . . that might well elude an untrained person, . . . [and]
. . . the evidence . . . must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis
by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”).
But see Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004) (rejecting as “arbitrar[ ]y”
the argument that “[a]n arrest made by a knowledgeable, veteran officer would
be valid, whereas an arrest made by a rookie in precisely the same circumstances
would not”).
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officers may be relevant in some cases. 172 Whether evidence
seized by police has an independent source, such that the fruitsof-the-poisonous-tree doctrine does not apply, may depend on the
subjective motivations of the officers, based on intent and the
“purpose and flagrancy” of the conduct. 173 In contrast to such
uses of subjective reasonableness, where the subjective intent of
the officer might show pretext or malicious action, the Court has
rejected any rule that would “attempt to root out subjective vices
through objective means.” 174 As the Court put it in Whren, encapsulating the complex view of reasonableness at work in the
area, “the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind
which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal
justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
that action.” 175 What does that even mean? It means that subjectively disturbing police action, such as intentionally unconstitutional actions, are excused so long as the hypothetical reasonable officer would have acted similarly. Objective reasonableness
preserves deference.
The second dimension comes into play in other Fourth
Amendment rulings. Shifting the objects for administrative
searches from officers to entire police departments, in an effort
to defer to police department policies, the Court asks whether
“programmatic purpose” and “special needs” justify a search,
even if it was not justified based on reasonable and individualized suspicion. 176 In contrast, a stop and frisk under Terry v.
Ohio may be made without probable cause, based on an individual officer’s “reasonable suspicion.” 177 And, as discussed, that an
officer uses deadly force in a manner that violates department
policy or a “programmatic purpose” may not matter at all, so far
as the officer’s actions under the specific circumstances were
reasonable.
For a wonderful send-up of the contradictions in what I have
called the first and second dimensions of the reasonableness
172. Peter B. Rutledge, Miranda and Reasonableness, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1011, 1017 (2005) (arguing that the Court engages in “subjective inquiry” when
examining “a particular officer ’s experiences” while using an “objective inquiry”
when examining a suspect’s actions during Fourth Amendment seizures).
173. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975).
174. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996).
175. Id. at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
176. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006).
177. 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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problem, Professor Ronald J. Bacigal provides this list of contrary conceptions and viewpoints in conducting a Fourth Amendment analysis of an encounter during which a police officer stops
a person and proceeds to question them; in that situation, the
Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment doctrine takes into consideration:
1. A reasonable person’s perception of the officer ’s initial approach.
2. The suspect’s actual response to the officer ’s approach.
3. The officer ’s intent to seize the person through means intentionally
applied.
4. The suspect’s subjective intent to consent to a search of his wallet.
5. A reasonable officer ’s perception of the scope of the consensual
search.
6. A reasonable person’s perception of whether he was in police custody.
7. The suspect’s subjective knowledge that he was addressing a police
officer.
8. A reasonable officer ’s perception of whether his comment was likely
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
9. Any unusual susceptibility of the particular defendant to covert persuasion.
10. The officer ’s actual knowledge of the suspect’s unusual susceptibility.
11. The suspect’s subjective ability to make a free and voluntary statement.
12. An objective assessment of whether the suspect waived his Miranda rights. 178

Professor Bacigal deplores these inconsistencies and summarizes: “At Center Court Wimbledon it is entertaining to watch
the ball shift back and forth between the opponents.” 179 Constitutional criminal procedure is complex in part because it attempts to regulate very difficult subject matter. But,
[i]t is less captivating to observe constitutional analysis in which the
United States Supreme Court appears to hide the ball, or at least
makes it difficult to appreciate the nature of the game being played, as
it shifts between objective and subjective perspectives of citizens, police
officers, and hypothesized reasonable people. 180

Unfortunately, the problem of the Fourth Amendment is
still more complex when one introduces the third dimension, regarding remedies: that of exclusion at a criminal trial and qualified immunity as applied to civil damages remedies. Still other
Fourth Amendment decisions limit access to the exclusionary
178. Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, 681–82 (1998).
179. Id. at 677.
180. Id.
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remedy at trial, based on a concept of reasonableness different
from a question whether the search or seizure itself was reasonable, focusing instead on whether an officer reasonably relied on
overruled-but-then-established prior precedent or on an erroneous warrant.181 Here again we see elaborate stacking of different
reasonableness inquiries. Thus, due to the doctrine of qualified
immunity, a court may ask at the summary judgment stage
whether a (1) reasonable jury could conclude that the police officer conducted an (2) unreasonable search or seizure or even, if
so, whether the officer acted objectively (3) reasonably given the
circumstances, and in (4) reasonable reliance on clearly established law. Reasonableness on top of reasonableness characterizes the entire project of litigating constitutional torts, but each
usage refers to different forms of reasonableness, including the
perspectives of jurors, officers, and those based on case law by
federal judges.
As Professors Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau put it, “It is
now possible to speak of that famous conundrum of reasonable
unreasonable searches—those searches that are sufficiently unreasonable that they deprive the defendant of his Fourth
Amendment right, but not so unreasonable that any remedy will
be forthcoming.” 182 Moreover, substantive Fourth Amendment
law itself reflects interpretations of reasonableness designed to
prevent undue exclusionary or damages remedies, and yet now
separate doctrines accomplish that goal along the remedial dimension. Thus, “current Fourth Amendment law is the worst of
both worlds—it produces a substantive Fourth Amendment corrupted by the fear of a mandatory exclusionary rule that no
longer exists.” 183
The much-lamented confusion in Fourth Amendment doctrine can be seen as a product of shifting choices made across
each of the three dimensions of constitutional reasonableness
doctrines: (1) concepts of reasonableness that are objective, subjective, or all-things-considered balancing; (2) objects of reason-

181. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423–24 (2011) (holding
that “searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate
precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule”); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (holding that “reliable physical evidence seized by officers
reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate . . . should be admissible in the prosecution’s case”).
182. Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth
Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 589, 591 (2014).
183. Id. at 592.
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ableness that vary between a police officer’s perspective, the citizen’s perspective, a combination of both, as well as that of society, and a police department; and (3) use of reasonableness to
craft exceptions and limits to exclusionary and damages remedies.
Scholars have made Herculean efforts to try to synthesize
Fourth Amendment doctrine. Yet still additional portions of the
Fourth Amendment, such as the separate-warrant requirement,
do not relate to the unreasonable-search-and-seizure requirement. Reconciling the use of reasonableness in the search and
seizure context, with tests that do not pertain to reasonableness,
raises still more complications. Some, like Professor Akhil Amar,
have hoped that the concept of reasonableness can do heavy lifting in that work, extending to govern and unify Fourth Amendment doctrine generally. 184 However, these shifting dimensions
suggest that unity cannot be found unless the concepts, objects,
and usages of reasonableness are all worked out through the doctrine, which would require still more Herculean efforts by scholars and agreement by judges and Justices. If reasonableness is
going to do such heavy lifting across so many aspects of Fourth
Amendment doctrine, then the careful parsing of concepts, objects, and usages of reasonableness must be carefully set out and
justified. Whether all of the current arrangements can be justified is equivocal.
3. Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment reflects similar variety in the usages
of reasonableness. The famous Miranda warnings need only be
provided to a person in custody, but whether a person is deemed
to be in custody depends on whether a person would reasonably
feel free to leave. 185 The Court has suggested this is a purely objective determination: “[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on
the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers

184. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 759 (1994) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment generally “require[s]
that all searches and seizures be reasonable”).
185. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (“[W]ould a reasonable
person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave.”); cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (requiring procedural safeguards when “a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”).
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or the person being questioned.” 186 The Court noted that the reasonable person standard was imported from the negligence
standard in torts, where it would be a jury determination, while,
in the Fifth Amendment context, it is considered a question of
law for a judge to decide.187
However, in its voluntariness case law concerning due process and Fifth Amendment protections against coercive police interrogations, the Supreme Court has examined subjective, as
well as objective, circumstances, sometimes focusing on the defendant as the proper object of inquiry and sometimes on the police officer. In decisions such as J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the
Court noted that the circumstances can include individual characteristics of the person, such as juvenile status, and thus one
should consider whether a reasonable juvenile—rather than a
reasonable adult—would feel free to leave.188 The Court explained: “[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at
the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.” 189 The
Court insisted it was adhering to an objective test, but it considered both the perspective of the officer and what the officer knew
(or reasonably should have known) about the vulnerability of the
individual defendant.190 How to reconcile that ruling with the
Court’s ruling that age and experience with law enforcement
were not relevant circumstances to the custody inquiry in Yarborough v. Alvarado is hard to say. 191 A reasonable person standard can admit consideration of relevant personal characteristics,
and for juveniles, the Court considers those that might make the
defendant perceive custody differently. 192 In Colorado v. Connelly, the Court rejected a claim by a grossly mentally ill person
who was easily coerced and led by the police. 193 The Court held
that, even if unreliable, a confession is not involuntary if it is not
186. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323–25 (1994) (per curiam) (stating that custody depends on “how a reasonable person in the position of the
individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her ‘freedom of
action’” (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984))).
187. Keohane, 516 U.S. at 113 n.13.
188. 564 U.S. 261, 275–76 (2011).
189. Id. at 277.
190. Id. at 272.
191. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666–69 (2004) (explaining
why age and experience with law enforcement are not objective circumstances).
192. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 275.
193. 479 U.S. 157, 159 (1986).
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the result of “coercive police conduct” and if the officer did not
engage in “wrongful acts” to affirmatively take advantage of the
defendant’s mental state. 194 In contrast, in Arizona v. Fulminante, the Court emphasized the defendant’s subjective “fear
of physical violence” from a prisoner who was a government cooperator.195 As Professor Kit Kinports has detailed, the Court
has not clearly explained how to resolve these cases and whether
it is solely the officer’s perspective that matters.196
In Yarborough, a different reasonableness inquiry limited
the remedy: the Justices concluded that, under AEDPA, reasonable jurists could disagree about the state of the law such that
the state judge did not make an “unreasonable determination” of
constitutional law in rejecting the Fifth Amendment claim, and
therefore, habeas relief was not warranted.197 Separately, in
cases not about custody but about the voluntariness of a suspect
during police interrogations, the Court has stated that age and
the characteristics of a person are relevant to voluntariness but
that it is explicitly a totality-of-the-circumstances test, asking
whether a person’s will was overborne by police questioning and
not a test that focuses on a concept of reasonableness.198
In still other rulings, the Supreme Court has created subjective good-faith exceptions to its ostensibly objective test asking
whether the officers “reasonably conveyed” the Miranda warnings, stating that even if a “reasonable person in the suspect’s
shoes” would not have understood that they had a choice
whether to continue to talk to the police or not, “a good-faith Miranda mistake” can excuse the failure to provide the warnings.199 The Court shifted from an objective-officer perspective to
an objective-suspect perspective and ultimately recognized a
subjective-officer exception. No wonder Professor Kinports has
carefully criticized the utter “confusion surrounding the controlling viewpoint in Miranda cases,” as well as whether “reasonableness” is objective or subjective. 200

194. Id. at 163–65.
195. 499 U.S. 279, 279, 287–88 (1991).
196. Kinports, supra note 3, at 121–22 (“In the end, the cases, and the divergent perspectives on which they turn, cannot be reconciled.”).
197. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).
198. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 284 (2011) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
199. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (plurality opinion).
200. Kinports, supra note 3, at 103.
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4. Sixth Amendment
A jury must find guilt in a criminal case using a beyond-areasonable-doubt standard. That standard is objective when assessed on appeal or post-conviction. One might expect Sixth
Amendment right-to-a-jury-trial rulings to chiefly focus on the
perspective of jurors, but that is not the case. In striking down
the United States Sentencing Guidelines in United States v.
Booker, the Supreme Court found that the Guidelines took factfinding away from jurors. 201 The remedy, though, included the
ability of appellate judges to approve a sentence as reasonable,
given a guideline’s range and statutory factors, among other considerations.202 The standard is one of judicial reasonableness,
not juror reasonableness. 203 In other contexts, the standard is
not a reasonableness standard at all: if a suspect requests counsel during an interrogation, for example, then that choice must
be strictly respected, whether it was reasonable or not. 204 Then
again, if the person waives the right to request counsel, the
standard is subjective, asking whether the defendant “intentionally” abandoned or relinquished the “known right.” 205
The use of reasonableness becomes still more ornate in the
context of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel rulings focus on two distinct forms of reasonableness. First, a court asks whether a reasonable lawyer, based on professional standards, provided
objectively unreasonable representation to the client. 206 Second,
the court asks whether that deficient representation prejudiced
the outcome, based on what reasonable jurors would have otherwise done. 207
That standard creates the possibility of stacked reasonableness review with not just the two forms of reasonableness used
to decide whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel but
also whether relief is warranted, based on the AEDPA standard
of review limiting relief unless the state judge was unreasonable
in dismissing the Sixth Amendment claim.208 The Supreme
201. 125 S. Ct. 738, 751–52 (2005).
202. Id. at 766.
203. See id.
204. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981).
205. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
206. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
207. Id. at 691–92.
208. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)
(2012)).
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Court has repeatedly called this review “doubly deferential.” 209
But, in fact, that is an understatement. There can be so many
different types of reasonableness elements to the consideration
of such a claim during federal habeas corpus review that the
stacking of these reasonableness inquiries becomes so ornate
and duplicative that judges may simply not bother to conduct
much of the inquiry. So, a federal judge might ask if the state
court actually went through all of the Supreme-Court-prescribed
motions: whether the state judge was (1) unreasonable when deciding whether the trial lawyer was (2) unreasonable in providing representation, and whether (3) reasonable jurors would
have found guilt beyond a (4) reasonable doubt, affecting the outcome at trial to a (5) reasonable degree such that there was prejudice. Added to that, a federal judge may consider whether the
state judge’s determination that any deficient performance by
counsel lacked prejudice was itself (6) unreasonable. While this
may sound byzantine, it is not unusual; ineffective assistance of
counsel is the most commonly litigated federal habeas corpus
claim. 210 The Supreme Court has often said that a judge need
only discuss the portions of the analysis necessary to resolve the
issue.211 In effect, a judge can pick and choose which reasonableness doctrine can most readily dismiss a constitutional claim.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS WRIT LARGE
Some scholars have argued that reasonableness should do
even more work in animating constitutional interpretation,
while others criticize particular usages of constitutional reasonableness. Still others view reasonableness as imprecise, but a
second-best solution where it is difficult to define constitutional
standards that must apply in a broad range of circumstances.
The thrust of the prior Parts, of course, has been that reasonableness is an overworked concept that stands for too many ideas
and functions. To be sure, the challenges that courts face in
adopting constitutional standards cannot be underestimated.
This Part and the next will turn to those challenges. Most recently, scholars have advanced greater use of reasonableness
standards to explain originalist interpretation and constitutional balancing more generally. It should be no surprise that a
209. Id. at 13; Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011).
210. See Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (describing ineffective assistance of counsel
as a “common claim”).
211. See, e.g., id. at 18 n.3 (declining to discuss prejudice after finding that
trial representation was not ineffective).
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jack-of-all-trades concept would be invoked to support new theories of constitutional interpretation. I, however, argue that based
on the evidence discussed in this Article, the critics of the overuse of constitutional reasonableness are correct that reasonableness doctrines risk manipulation—and in more ways than had
been understood and along entirely separate dimensions of constitutional interpretation. The burden should be on an advocate
of the use of a reasonableness test to show why it improves on
alternatives, and in Part IV, I will describe what is, in my view,
a preferable approach towards constitutional reasonableness.
A. REASONABLE PERSON ORIGINALISM
Originalism has an indeterminacy problem—assessing
what the Framers and ratifiers would have thought about a
given constitutional problem—and it should be no surprise that
the reasonable person should be asked to assist. As Professors
Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman describe, a range of originalist
scholars have in their writing “endorsed reliance upon the reasonable person in constitutional interpretation.” 212 In the view
of scholars advancing this notion of originalism, the perspective
of an ordinary speaker—a reasonable perspective—determines
the meaning of the Constitution. Professors John O. McGinnis
and Michael B. Rappaport argue, “the focus of originalism,” in
constitutional interpretation, “should be on how a reasonable
person at the time of the Constitution’s adoption would have underst[ood] its words and thought they should be interpreted.” 213
This is a reasonable person as of 1788, presumably among that
limited group of males that had the franchise (or perhaps it
should be limited to those who participated in framing or ratification decisions). Such details are irrelevant to the theory, which
focuses not on the subjective intent of the Framers, even taken
collectively, but rather on the reasonable meaning of the text
based on ordinary usage at the time. 214 Thus, Professor Lawrence Solum asks: “How would an ordinary American citizen flu-

212. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 n.11 (2006).
213. John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 374 (2007).
214. See Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History:
New Originalism or Eclecticism, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 285 (2014); Lawrence
B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 1, 2–3 (2011).
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ent in English as spoken in the late eighteenth century have understood the words and phrases that make up its clauses?” 215
The perspective of an ordinary, or reasonable, speaker addresses
the problem of trying to assess subjective motivations or intent.
Whether it is possible to compile sufficient evidence to ascertain
what an ordinary speaker would have thought, or whether constitutional text was designed to reflect a reasonable person’s
speech rather than legal terminology, raises a different set of
challenges. In addition, others argue that the concept of looking
to a reasonable speaker at the time is itself anachronistic. For
example, Professor Stephen Feldman has argued that there was
no pervasive usage in the common law at that time of the concept
of a reasonable person.216 The adoption of such a standard in tort
law came decades later. Thus, Professor Feldman argues:
“Whereas today, lawyers and judges often invoke the reasonable
person as a generalized legal standard establishing an individual’s duty of care in a wide variety of circumstances, jurists during the early decades of nationhood discerned duties of care as
established in the status-relationships of the disputants.” 217
The usage in constitutional interpretation, however, is different than usage for a tort standard of care. It is a gloss on a
modern interpretive task. It seeks to impose a sort of standard
on the interpretation of constitutional text. Perhaps reasonable
care to assess what an ordinary citizen might have thought
about constitutional text is the best that can be expected of
judges. A different criticism, though, is that to interpret text
based on a concept of reasonableness could add a veneer of objectivity to an enterprise that is anything but. After all, a reasonable person, or the Framers themselves, may have understood phrases in a document like the Constitution to express
familiar concepts from pre-existing sources, like the English Bill
of Rights, and not based on commonplace meaning of the words
and phrases in everyday vernacular. What a reasonable person
thought about suspension of habeas corpus may not be as informative as the desire to prevent suspensions of certain types
that had occurred for centuries in England. Another reason to
overlay reasonableness to describe the undertaking may be to
obscure the uncertainty of the task, and the relative lack of historical information or expertise that lawyers and judges have to
undertake it. Reasonableness provides a very low bar for any
215. Solum, supra note 214, at 3.
216. Feldman, supra note 214, at 305.
217. Id.
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seeking to justify an argument about the original meaning of the
Constitution. All that must be invoked is a reasonable approximation for what a person might have thought of the language at
the time, without strong evidence for what drafters or other relevant individuals actually thought about legal concepts or constitutional rights. Similarly, judges would have a low bar by
which their rulings would have to be justified, perhaps far lower
than the bar if they had to articulate support in precedent, policy, or other constitutional norms. Without criticizing or endorsing reasonable-ordinary-speaker approaches, if it does adopt a
reasonableness bar, it resembles the low reasonableness bar
adopted in many other modern constitutional contexts.
B. HARMONIZING OR OBSCURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
In some contexts, a move to reasonableness review has been
a move away from examining the subjective motivations of government actors, whether they be executive actors, legislators, or
judges. In general, one might expect such a move to be a useful
and more objective mode of constitutional review. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes might applaud this as a form of tracking the
development of the common law from standards focused on retribution and blameworthiness towards objective standards of
care. 218 Thus, negligence standards are not adopted “for the purpose of improving men’s hearts, but . . . to give a man a fair
chance to avoid doing the harm before he is held responsible for
it,” in order to “reconcile the reasonable freedom of others with
the protection of the individual from injury.”219 That, in constitutional law, judges would follow the same path might suggest
more objective guides have been located to better provide notice
to government officials and members of the public. Yet constitutional law is not private law—constitutional reasonableness
standards rarely look like negligence or criminal law mens rea
standards. The use of the word reasonable in standards for decision and for review can disguise the lack of objective criteria
used, or the maintenance of quite subjective standards masquerading as reasonable. Constitutional reasonableness often stands
in for a range of considerations that vary from one to another.
While a move towards objective standards of care might be beneficial in some areas, that is not typically so, and the result
218. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 115 (Transaction
Publishers 2005) (1881).
219. Id.
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makes for confused constitutional law and still more troubling
decisions as lower courts apply this doctrine.
One response by some scholars is that even if many reasonableness standards are largely a fig leaf, they are a useful second-best in an imprecise and imperfect world. They have argued
that reasonableness standards can beneficially harmonize disparate standards, whether they are standards of care or standards of review, by at least giving them a common label. 220 Thus,
a defender of the reasonable person standard in tort law would
point to its unifying power, even if, in practice, what is reasonable is highly fact-dependent and will require fact-sensitive and
industry-sensitive judgments.221 An additional feature of such a
defense may be an argument that no further precision in the doctrine can fairly be demanded. Those arguments have some real
merit.
Thus, Professor David Zaring has argued that, in administrative law, a multiplicity of standards of review can apply to
agency action, but that in practice, they are inconsistently applied, whether it is Chevron review or rationality review or hardlook review, and that the doctrine “at least as it actually exists,”
is really “something more like a ‘reasonable agency’ standard.” 222
Calling disparate standards a single reasonableness standard
may be more intellectually honest, in such a view—it simplifies
the law and better describes the actual practice. It results in
fewer ornate or even “impossible” sets of standards of review,
and prevents judges from drawing “obscure curtains” across the
doctrine.223 A counter-argument, however, is that reasonableness would then serve as a fig leaf, or a way to sweep under the
rug, a great deal of uncertainty in how to review agency action.
Naming the standards of review reasonableness review may
eliminate complex legal fictions, but it would not necessarily focus judges on the appropriate criteria for review. It would simply
acknowledge, perhaps, a failed project.
The problem is different and far greater in constitutional
law than in administrative law, where across three dimensions,
reasonableness does not simplify doctrine but instead engenders
an array of complexities much-criticized rather than appreciated
220. David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 525–26
(2011).
221. Id. at 538–39.
222. Id. at 535.
223. Id. at 559; see also David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV.
135, 186–87 (2010).
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across doctrines and dimensions. That said, some have also argued that constitutional reasonableness would simplify, rather
than obscure, the challenges of constitutional interpretation.
Perhaps most prominently, Professor Akhil Amar has argued
that the Fourth Amendment should not only be read as a whole
to embrace a concept of reasonableness, and not just as to the
“unreasonable search and seizure” portion of it. 224 He has argued
that we can use “constitutional reasonableness” to evaluate “procedural regularity as well as substantive fairness” and rule-oflaw values as well as “race and class” and “sex” discrimination.225
Descriptively, it has become correct that much of constitutional law does reflect reasonableness review—I have described
just how pervasive constitutional reasonableness has become.
Perhaps no greater precision can be demanded of complex constitutional balancing. But using the word reasonableness obscures the bewildering array of concepts and legal roles in which
the review consists. Judges can act as if they are not conducting
constitutional balancing by using the label of reasonableness.
Standards can be shifted entirely using the same label of reasonableness. Whether using the same word to refer to very different
standards of care, liability, and review is the best model for constitutional interpretation—and, more specifically, whether
Fourth Amendment case law provides anything approaching a
good model for constitutional interpretation—is a highly equivocal question. If it is the system that we have and that will not
change, far more care must be used to define each type of reasonableness being applied across each dimension.
C. REASONABLENESS AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Others have criticized the incorporation of reasonableness
standards into constitutional law for some of the same reasons
that they have been criticized in common law fields: they invite
judicial adoption of perspectives that reflect those of the majority
viewpoint and not the diversity of perspectives and persons being regulated. One can think of these as dimension-two critiques
of constitutional reasonableness. Reasonableness standards can
be an invitation to cognitive bias in resolving the most serious
problems in our democracy. Professors Dan Kahan, David Hoff224. Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First
Principles 37–39 (1997).
225. Id.
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man and Donald Braman have written about how jurors responded to the use of force in the vehicle chase at issue in the
Supreme Court’s Scott v. Harris decision in a range of ways that
was, for some sets of values, quite consistent with how the Justices viewed the car chase. 226 One response is that their criticism
misses a different point: that reasonableness may, as a matter of
substantive Fourth Amendment law, reflect an objective standard of care but that it is not one for jurors to freely opine upon.
In fact, the Supreme Court moved towards reasonableness in
both Fourth Amendment law, and more importantly, along dimension three, in qualified immunity law precisely to empower
judges to take such questions away from juries. 227
Reasonableness, in that view, is a tool for judicial control—
a way to make more questions of law that can be resolved by a
judge on summary judgment or before a criminal trial. It is a tool
for judicial control that has the appearance of deferring to community norms without actually doing so. Jury reasonableness
standards are, ideally, at least based on a theory of lay decisionmaking. But, for the most part, constitutional reasonableness
standards do not reflect objective standards of care. They instead
reflect the rulings of reasonable judges. Some applaud this. Professors Lawson and Seidman argue:
If, however, constitutional meaning depends upon a distinctively legal
construct such as the reasonable person, as we maintain, then determining constitutional meaning is more properly the province of legal
experts. The people best able to glean the legally-constructed thoughts
of a legally-constructed person are likely to be lawyers and legal scholars. Historians, psychologists, and linguists may have something, and
even much, to contribute to this legal enterprise, but constitutional interpretation remains a distinctively legal, rather than a distinctively
historical, linguistic, or psychological, task. 228

Perhaps the federal courts are at their most candid, if least
helpful, towards development of the law when they say that constitutional rights and remedies are available only when reasonable jurists would provide them. That move is less a slide into
subjectivity than into judicial solipsism. The goal is to give
judges discretion and insulate their rulings from review, under
the guise of objectivity. To question such a ruling would be to
question the reasonableness of a judge.
226. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009);
see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
227. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 (“ The question we need to answer is whether
Scott’s actions were objectively reasonable.”).
228. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 212, at 50.
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A seemingly simple concept of deference, however, can produce highly complex doctrine. At the Supreme Court level, shifting membership and judicial approaches among the Justices can
result in ever more complex rulings interpreting reasonableness,
with varying rules and exceptions across each of the dimensions
explored. More broadly, even if the Justices appreciate the clarity that reasonableness standards can provide, if seemingly
bright-line standards of care become eroded through inconsistencies, such as subjective exceptions, shifting objects, or remedial rules, then the clarity supplied may only be superficial.
While this can be a challenge in any area in which legal standards must be interpreted, the concept of reasonableness can disguise especially deep disagreements between the Justices concerning the constitutional balancing tests adopted, including
questions as fundamental as whose interests are to be taken into
account. As Professor Kit Kinports argues, the Court has used
concepts of reasonableness that have “shifted opportunistically
among different perspectives, based on neither the principles underlying the constitutional provisions at issue nor the attributes
of the tests themselves.” 229 Unfortunately, that tradition is endemic across a wide range of constitutional doctrines. The problems become magnified in the lower courts, as judges struggle to
apply these rules to complex fact situations, in which it really
matters whether the test is objective or subjective or reflects
standards of care or not. Reasonableness begets highly unreasonable doctrine and results.
IV. TOWARDS A REGULATORY REASONABLENESS
Across a large body of constitutional law, reasonableness
doctrines look patently unreasonable in their application and
even in their definition. This need not be so. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam famously wrote about the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness test adopted by the Supreme Court in Katz v.
United States, “In the end, the basis of the Katz decision seems
to be that the [F]ourth [A]mendment protects those interests
that may justifiably claim [F]ourth [A]mendment protection.” 230
That statement leaves us where we left off in Part III of this Article, with a defense of constitutional reasonableness as perhaps
the best the courts can be expected to do, but still a self-referential standard with very little content. Professor Amsterdam,
229. Kinports, supra note 3, at 133.
230. Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 385.
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however, moved from the Court’s approach to a new one and advocated a positive change in focus in Fourth Amendment law. He
argued for a regulatory model, in which police discretion would
be informed and confined by written police practices and legislation, within Fourth Amendment limits. 231 Specifically, the goal
of the constitutional right would be not just to protect “specific
interests of specific individuals” whose rights were abused, but
also to “regulat[e] police practices broadly, generally[,] and directly.” 232 The goal is for a constitutional standard to inform and
supplement regulatory policies, but for the Constitution to not
be the sole protection.
Such an approach permits constitutional reasonableness to
be informed by industry practices, policy, and regulation, and to
in turn credit sound practices, policy, and regulation. That regulatory approach better resembles the administrative review doctrines that Professor David Zaring endorses, where deference is
due to empirically informed administrative fact-finding. 233 I
strongly agree with such a use of reasonableness standards and
have argued that, in general, constitutional reasonableness can
and should actually refer to objective and informed standards of
care, as it can sometimes do in the tort context. Reasonableness
should refer to objective standards, not actions by individuals
under particularized circumstances. In short, many of the endemic problems identified in Parts I, II, and III of this Article
can be addressed through a regulatory concept of constitutional
reasonableness. In this Part, I hope to show why that concept
improves on existing doctrine, why it is compatible with existing
doctrine, and why it can solve still additional puzzles and difficulties in existing constitutional law. I will also discuss important and quite serious objections to such a concept of constitutional review, including that there may not be agreed upon
best practices, empirical evidence may conflict, practices may be
changing and improving over time, and such questions may be
better suited to legislators making policy decisions rather than
administrative agencies or local government.

231. Id. at 409 (proposing “a requirement that police discretion to conduct
search and seizure activity be tolerably confined by either legislation or policemade rules and regulations, subject to judicial review for reasonableness”).
232. Id. at 372.
233. See Zaring, supra note 220, at 525–26.
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A. A REGULATORY CONCEPT OF REASONABLENESS
What would a regulatory or empirically informed reasonableness look like in the areas of constitutional law discussed in
this Article? Professor Anthony Amsterdam argued that we
should not have a system in which “the Constitution is our one
instrument for keeping the police within the rule of law.” 234 Instead, constitutional rulings should set “minimum standards”
and areas of concern as well as “inform and monitor” enforcement, but police should have primary responsibility for regulating themselves.235 Amsterdam urged a rule of constitutional law
wherein the Fourth Amendment would (1) presumptively find a
search or seizure constitutional if it was conducted pursuant either to legislation or to police department rules and regulations;
(2) require that the statutes or police rules be “reasonably particular” in setting out the permissible bounds of police searches
and seizures; and (3) require that those statutes or rules be consistent with existing Fourth Amendment requirements.236
Such an approach resembles an administrative law regime
where there is deference to an administrative agency (here, local
police agencies or state legislatures) if they make policy decisions within reasonable bounds. The approach rewards sound
self-regulation and defers to best practices, but the federal courts
would be tasked with reviewing those regulations and may find
outlier approaches violative. The approach reduces arbitrariness
without imposing a detailed code of procedure. Scholars who recommend administrative law approaches to criminal procedure
generally now favor such approaches, which take some of the
weight from constitutional interpretation. The courts, Amsterdam recommended, could instead incline more towards a “requirement of police-made rules judicially reviewable for reasonableness.” 237 Rather than defer to individual officer action as
reasonable or not, the starting place would be on regulation.
More constitutional review would look like review of regulations
or of legislation, based on empirically-informed assessments of
policy—not just of individual action.
A generation of new-administrativist scholars has advanced
such an approach more broadly in a range of areas in which expert administrative agencies do not currently exist to sufficiently
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 380.
Id. at 380, 409.
Id. at 416–17.
Id. at 405.
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protect constitutional rights. 238 To be sure, some of that scholarship neglects to consider that, in some areas, there are already
agencies tasked with protection of constitutional rights. Take the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, for example, or
the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Some
scholarship, then, critically assesses the role of such agencies in
developing regulations to define and protect constitutional
rights, or imagines a more robust role for those agencies at the
federal, state, and local levels to protect constitutional rights. 239
Another strain of this area of legal scholarship has advocated that administrative law norms be extended to areas in
which regulation is largely lacking, such as within prosecutors’
offices, an area explored by Professors Rachel Barkow, Stephanos Bibas, Gerard Lynch, Daniel Richman, and others.240 That
scholarship, while diverse, in part assesses existing government
institutions and asks whether additional procedures and norms
could better regulate those institutions. In addition, a wide
range of new-governance scholarship has asked, for more than
two decades, whether rulemaking and regulation could be better
informed by democratic participation combined with rigorous assessment of best practices. 241
Yet another strain of scholarship emphasizes that individual case-specific adjudication is inadequate to address systemic
238. See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1043–44 (2016) (proposing that courts apply an
administrative law framework to cases involving surveillance). See generally
Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of
New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 406, 439 (2007) (tracing
the evolution of judicial deference to administrative expertise in the 1930s and
1940s).
239. See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing Department of Justice suits
under § 14141 seeking institutional reform of police departments); Anne Noel
Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 671, 702–08 (2005) (explaining why the EEOC still plays an essential
role in eradicating discrimination).
240. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006);
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2117, 2150 (1998); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents,
Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752 (2003).
241. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267
(1998); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
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problems that arise in government programs. Professor Tracey
L. Meares has described how “individual-level analysis” is not
suitable for addressing systemic law enforcement programs like
stop-and-frisk. 242 I have argued that individual review using appellate or post-conviction review is not suitable for addressing
systemic errors in criminal adjudication, as has Professor Eve
Brensike Primus.243 A range of solutions have been proposed to
these problems. I have suggested that aggregate or class actionstyle regulation might better address systemic issues, or that administrative agencies outside the courts might better regulate
such questions.244 Professor Andrew Crespo has argued that systemic data might better be harnessed by courts. 245 Others have
focused on incentivizing democratic rulemaking by government
actors themselves.246 In addition, scholars have argued social
science and empirical research should more generally inform
constitutional rights or constitutional criminal procedure, including in more complex hybrid models, in which courts serve a
role in overseeing experimentation by government actors. 247
One objection to such deference is that not all agencies deserve the deference that they might receive; for example, some
questions may not be well informed by policy or research. Local
law enforcement agencies do not have the resources to conduct
research, or even spend much time assessing existing research
in the way that a federal agency can do. Nor are there industry
groups that typically conduct major research projects on topics
related to a range of civil rights. Professor Ronald Allen has argued that police rules do not deserve deference, since they do not
have expertise, they may not be agencies that are very account-

242. Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
159, 164 (2015).
243. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, supra note 20; Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2010).
244. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, supra
note 20.
245. Crespo, supra note 24.
246. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 22, at 1833.
247. See generally Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword:
Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 743–44 (2000); Dorf & Sabel,
supra note 241.
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able to the public, and, ultimately, such questions would be better settled through legislation. 248 There is also the danger that
courts are not well situated to evaluate scientific research even
when good research has been conducted. The story of the development of constitutional rights in a range of contexts has been
the story of the courts disregarding scientific research that counseled very different protections for constitutional rights.
One advantage of regulatory reasonableness review is that
it can, in theory, generate more detailed and informed regulation. That is why scholars since the 1970s have argued that a
regulatory model can empower judicial review, but also limit it
and inform judicial deference to agencies. Professors Barry
Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko have argued that policing is
poorly regulated by courts and that courts should instead incentivize review by agencies, in similar ways to those proposed by
Professor Anthony Amsterdam, in the Fourth Amendment context, and Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, in the policing context
more generally. 249
For an example, take Fourth Amendment use-of-force
standards. The Fourth Amendment provides a general right to
be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” 250 Professor
Seth Stoughton and I, along with many others, have criticized
the Supreme Court for focusing the reasonableness inquiry in
that context on the split-second in which the officer decides to
use force. 251 The Court has emphasized that there are no bright
line rules or even clear standards, so that officers may use deadly
force so long as it is objectively reasonable to do so in the circumstances of each case.252 Such an approach certainly limits civil
liability of officers. But it does not provide any guidance for officers or police supervisors, who instead adopt detailed policies

248. Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling
Principle and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 80–81 (1976).
249. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 22, at 1833 n.28 (“ This drum has
been beat, periodically, for at least the last fifty years. . . . [W]e stand on the
shoulders of giants . . . .” (citing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION
(1975)); Amsterdam, supra note 19.
250. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“ The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
251. POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, USE OF FORCE: TAKING POLICING TO A HIGHER STANDARD, at nos. 2, 5 & 15 (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www
.policeforum.org/assets/30guidingprinciples.pdf; Garrett & Stoughton, supra
note 6.
252. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007).
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designed to minimize the need to use force generally, and to prevent the need to use deadly force. Such police tactics are part of
the training of any reasonable police officer. Officers should be
held to the standards of their profession, and not to a rock-bottom constitutional floor where any split-second reaction is
deemed reasonable, no matter how rash or preventable through
prior actions. We call for an empirically grounded constitutional
reasonableness in the use of force context, asking whether police
officers followed sound policy and training to minimize the need
to use force and deescalate. If deadly force was not avoidable,
then officers should not be liable, but officers should be liable
(really, the agencies that indemnify the individual officers) for
unnecessary use of deadly force. The reasonable officer reacting
in the moment is replaced by the reasonably trained officer, and
the focus is on systemic questions of police training, rather than
on the individual circumstances at the moment deadly force was
used.
Other constitutional rights can benefit from an empirically
informed focus on the general, not the specific, circumstances
and on industry norms rather than individual preferences. In
criminal procedure, other objective reasonableness standards
can and should be informed by research on what a reasonably
trained officer would do. Whether an individual can consent to a
search or voluntarily agree to be interrogated should be informed
by research on the vulnerability of, for example, the mentally ill
and juveniles. Officers should not be off the hook if they subjectively had no idea that the suspect was mentally ill or disabled
or a juvenile. Sound training on such questions should be expected—and it will be if the constitutional reasonableness standard creates that expectation.
Turning to civil rights, rational basis review could be better
informed by a regulatory reasonableness standard. That is, although deference will be due to any potentially reasonable legislative determination, if there is factual evidence of bias or animus, then the Supreme Court has been correct to tighten the
inquiry into the goals served by the legislation. Thus, scholars
have argued that in Lawrence, the Court correctly emphasized
that an anti-sodomy statute “furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual.” 253 While the Court has sometimes stated
that “the theory of rational-basis review . . . does not require the
253. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003); Araiza, supra note 129.
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State to place any evidence in the record,” such evidence should
be put in the record if the plaintiff has some evidence or arbitrary
or discriminatory motive. 254 There should be a burden-shifting
analysis, even in the context of rational basis review; such a shift
in the burden may explain why the Court sometimes appears to
add teeth to rational basis review. Considering the factual record
should be more routine when constitutional rights are at stake,
and burden shifting can help to sort out cases deserving more
careful inquiry.
Areas in which reasonableness informs a standard of review
and refers to a probability, could also be informed by a regulatory
concept. Research could inform the question whether an event is
reasonably probable or not. If the question is whether a jury reasonably was affected by the lawyer’s failure to challenge a confession, a court could take notice of studies examining the question, and it could be expected to adopt general rules regulating
lawyers and insisting that they litigate questions of real importance to jurors. Or, take the reasonably probable standard for
determining whether a violation of Brady v. Maryland by prosecutors deserves reversal of a conviction. If a prosecutor’s office
does not have clear policy or training on the Brady obligation to
provide exculpatory evidence to the defense, or if that policy was
violated, perhaps that should inform the constitutional analysis.
The Supreme Court itself has stated that its rule “requires less
of the prosecution than the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,
which call generally for prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence
tending to exculpate or mitigate.” 255 Many commentators have
similarly criticized the Brady rule as toothless, where prosecutors can make their own judgments whether evidence is sufficiently material to turn over to the defense. Rather than defer to
those judgments using after-the-fact reasonableness review, a
court could first ask what the prosecutor’s policy is on disclosure
of exculpatory or impeachment evidence. If that policy was itself
reasonable and followed, prosecutors would benefit from deference. If not, though, the Court would conduct further review.
Similarly, reasonableness rules that relate to questions of
proportionality could also adopt a more regulatory posture. It
might not be enough to defer to a reasonable decision to keep a
person in indefinite civil commitment; the Court might instead
expect an empirically informed policy and set of regulations for
assessing whether individuals in general pose a risk and should
254. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
255. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
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be kept in ongoing civil confinement. Absent such a validated
policy and regulations, even a seemingly sensible individual decision should not be approved, given the lack of a sound framework for making such decisions.
One area in which the Court has adopted such an approach
deferring to regulatory expertise provides a set of quite cautionary lessons. The Supreme Court held in the context of constitutional challenges to prison regulations, including burdens on
First Amendment rights, to the right to marry, and other rights,
that such regulations are valid if “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 256 The Court explicitly adopted a
regulatory model in that context, or at least seemed to do so initially, when the standard was first developed in the 1970s. The
Court explained that such a standard is necessary if “prison administrators . . . and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult
judgments concerning institutional operations.”257 The Court
saw the need for such an approach where the challenge is made
directly to regulations that burden constitutional rights (or to
statutes that benefit from rational-basis deference).
However, the development of the law and remedies in the
area of prison-conditions litigation resulted in rulings that better
resemble blanket deference to prison administrators than any
model of regulatory reasonableness. 258 In the lower courts, often
any reason given by prison officials is seen as an objective and
legitimate, or reasonable, basis for a prison policy. 259 The doctrine was developed during a time when federal courts and the
Supreme Court had begun to turn away from structural reform
litigation and oversight of public institutions, and so the Supreme Court highlighted the need to “maintain institutional security” 260 and the “complex and intractable” problems of prison

256. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
257. Id. (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433
U.S. 119, 127 (1977)).
258. Mikel-Meredith Weidman, Comment, The Culture of Judicial Deference
and the Problem of Supermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1506–46 (2004).
For empirical analysis, see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact:
An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 793 (2006).
259. See Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and
Prisoner Interests in Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1815, 1822–33 (2012).
260. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
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administration “not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.” 261 Making the law still more restrictive, Congress later
stepped in with legislation to narrow remedies in prison conditions cases in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.262
Thus, in the Eighth Amendment area, the federal courts do
not ask careful questions about whether the prison administrators adopt policies that are the least restrictive, or most justified,
or supported by evidence. 263 They could be required to do so, but
the Supreme Court had increasingly emphasized deference in
the area, and then Congress has stepped in. While the area could
have been one in which regulatory reasonableness would result
in a body of informed regulation, the area instead resulted in
largely rote deference to prison administrators. The experience
in that area suggests that regulatory reasonableness has to be
taken seriously by judges, the relevant regulators, and legislators. Judges must actually inquire into whether the regulation
or rule is supported by evidence. Clear rules requiring objective
support to be offered by regulators for their regulations must be
set out. Otherwise, the entire effort may degenerate into blanket
deference.
B. REGULATORY OBJECTS OF REASONABLENESS
Significant confusion in constitutional law flows from uncertainty about which actor’s conduct should be assessed for its reasonableness. There should be a preference (if not a rule) on this
question for a given constitutional right and it should not simply
be up to whichever court happens to be reviewing a claim to decide on whom to place the burden upon. The problem disappears,
however, if reasonableness is assessed on a general level, and
based on standards of care instead of individual preferences or
circumstances. I have argued that a regulatory or systemic focus
is typically preferable for questions of constitutional importance.
If a police officer must be trained on how to identify a mentally
ill person, then it does not matter whether the officer was confused, even reasonably so, by the actions of a particular mentally

261. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 n.16 (1981) (quoting Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974)).
262. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2012).
263. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth
Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.881 (2009); Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53 (2009).
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ill person. If the officer did not follow the steps that sound training would recommend to identify such a person, then the perspectives of that officer and that suspect do not matter. The
standard would focus on general standards of care—obviating
the need for byzantine and case-specific rules about who should
reasonably have said and done what during a multi-step encounter.
C. REGULATORY REASONABLENESS REVIEW
When courts use reasonableness standards to inform review
of constitutional rights or to determine whether a remedy is appropriate, that review should be informed by objective and empirical sources, and not just whatever the reviewing judge calls
reasonable. Take the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Courts
typically defer to performance of counsel based on some notion
that it fell within the range of acceptable strategic decisions, or
it likely did not prejudice the outcome at trial. 264 That analysis
could be actually objective, and not just based on judges’ hunches
as to what might have happened, had the lawyer done the job
differently. That is, empirical evidence could inform the analysis, based on studies of jury behavior and assessment of trial evidence. I have argued that the Sixth Amendment can and should
be validated through such an evidence-based approach.265
More generally, the analogous reasonableness standards
built into harmless error review of constitutional rights asserted
in criminal cases on appeal and post-conviction are susceptible
to better-informed empirical research. Scholars have proposed
empirical methods for harmless-error analysis, for example, to
use jury research to inform harmless-error determinations. 266 A
large body of research has described how difficult it is to expect
judges to engage in counterfactual reasoning, asking how a trial
would have come out differently absent a constitutional error,
and putting to one side evidence of guilt that may bias a judge to

264. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984) (finding that
the proper standard was reasonably effective assistance and that even if counsel’s assistance was unreasonable, the defendant suffered insufficient prejudice).
265. Brandon L. Garrett, Validating the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 927 (2013).
266. D. Alex Winkelman et al., An Empirical Method for Harmless Error, 46
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1405 (2014).
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confirm the prior outcome. 267 Whether judges will take evidencebased analysis seriously is more equivocal, but it would improve
upon reasonableness rubber-stamping.
The appropriate level of deference to regulations also raises
important issues. Controversies over when and whether federal
judges should defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes under the Chevron doctrine have engendered a vast scholarship and complex case law. 268 Moreover, agencies can be presumed to have expertise, as well as delegated authority,
regarding statutes concerning their own regulatory authority,
but perhaps not constitutional rights, which raise very different
separation of powers concerns regarding the judicial obligation
to ensure that the Constitution is followed.
Several guideposts can nevertheless be set out here. One response to the criticism that judges would abdicate their role to
defer to administrative regulations regarding constitutional
rights is that judges already engage in broad deference, but are
not informed by adequate information. Offering no reasonableness deference when an agency has no regulation at all on a subject touching on constitutional rights seems like a logical place
to start. Taking away the benefit of reasonableness deference,
whether regarding the definition of the violation or whether a
remedy should result, when the agency does not provide evidentiary support for its regulation, would also be a fairly easy principle for judges to administer. Whether a constitutional violation
can be insulated by a regulation that appears reasonable but was
not followed will raise important questions regarding the reach
of constitutional remedies. Perhaps no defense should be availing in such circumstances.
The more difficult situations will arise where government
officials say they were following a regulation. They might even
have a regulation parroting the constitutional floor: “Police officers shall use deadly force when reasonable to do so under the
totality of the circumstances.” 269 That policy is close to none at
267. Id. at 1411; D. Brian Wallace & Saul M. Kassin, Harmless Error Analysis: How Do Judges Respond to Confession Errors, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 151
(2012).
268. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see,
e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006).
269. See generally Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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all, but they might then add: “[w]e believe that this policy is
highly effective and better than the alternatives.” A judge should
ask what evidence supports that conclusion. If lawmakers or regulators do adopt rules designed to prevent constitutional violations, but there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning their
effectiveness, then perhaps the reasonableness issue should be
litigated just as in a tort suit. The fact finder can decide whether
a minimalistic policy truly is a reasonable policy that can protect
individual constitutional rights. In constitutional tort cases, detailed questions are already asked whether an official acted reasonably, but without much content concerning what that
means. 270 Adding the fact that a rule or regulation was addressed to the situation in which the constitutional right was allegedly violated could at least add more content to the litigation.
In many areas, such practices do inform the fact finding concerning whether a constitutional violation occurred and deserves a
remedy. 271
Whether a regulatory vision of reasonableness could supplement, or even supplant, rational basis review raises more difficult questions. If the government has no regulation at all in
place, perhaps that should be presumptively irrational, but typically (outside of the criminal justice setting in which agencies so
often lack detailed regulations) there is a policy or a statute being challenged as unconstitutional. Whether a more evidencebased approach, focusing on best practices and effectiveness,
could inform review is a broader question. If the purpose of rational basis review is to, apart from explicit animus, broadly defer to legislative and administrative policy expertise, then a regulatory model of reasonableness would serve no useful role. If
the goal is to test government justifications factually, to at least
some degree, then a more evidence-based approach would be
warranted.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have developed three dimensions of constitutional reasonableness. Within each there are, in turn, a range
of alternative approaches and usages of a reasonableness test.

270. See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 509 F.2d 626, 629 (6th Cir. 1975);
Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 1967); Wiseman v.
United States, 327 F.2d 701, 707 (3d Cir. 1964).
271. See, e.g., Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 6 (describing the role that
police practices already play in use-of-force litigation).
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First, reasonableness can be used with conceptions that are objective, subjective, utility-based, or custom-based, sometimes
with more than one usage in the context of a particular right.
Second, as to the objects of reasonableness standards, they may
be institutional or individualized and assessed from the perspective of judges, officials, legislators, or citizens. Third, the standard may apply to a right or to an assertion of defenses, or waivers, or remedial limitations, or standards of review, or
potentially blurring the distinctions between each of these.
For a wonderfully candid assessment of the uncertainties
that can result from such reasonableness doctrine, read this description from a treatise on municipal ordinances:
It is impossible to be didactic, or even precise, in discussing the rule
that an ordinance must be reasonable to be valid. The decision as to
the reasonableness of any type of regulation depends a great deal on
subjective factors—the temperament and experience of the judges,
their attitude toward society and particularly toward the activity concerned, their training, education and other personal traits. 272

One pities the municipal lawyer that must explain the standard
to the city officials concerned about passing valid ordinances. Or,
as Chief Judge Roger Traynor put it in his classic treatment of
harmless-error doctrine: “The nebulous test of reasonableness is
unlikely to foster uniformity either in the application of standards, should there be any, or in the pragmatic exercise of discretion.” 273
Yet constitutional reasonableness is here to stay. It is the
glue that holds together vastly disparate constitutional provisions and standards. As Professors Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau put it, “it is unlikely that any area of law lacks a reasonableness test at the center of a core doctrine.” 274 Pervasive
constitutional borrowing has led the Court to pull reasonableness standards from civil to criminal settings, from discrimination law to free speech law, from standards of care to standards
for relief on appeal or in habeas corpus petitions. In many of
those areas, the indeterminate and even circular nature of the
constitutional reasonableness standard can be a source of its
strength. If a reasonable official must actually adhere to objectively sound practices, then officials have standards to follow
and the public knows what to expect. If it is judges, though, calling conduct reasonable post hoc, without setting any standards
272. THOMAS A. MATTHEWS & BYRON S. MATTHEWS, MUNICIPAL ORDI§ 2.07 (2d ed. 1983).
273. ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 34–35 (1970).
274. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 182, at 590.
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of care, then reasonableness turns into a form of blanket deference that does not inform officials or give the public clear guidance on what their rights actually are.
If only judges kept the three dimensions of constitutional
reasonableness distinct, we might not see varying stacked concepts of reasonableness doing double or triple duty, for the adjudication of even a single federal constitutional claim. That the
proliferation of these reasonableness standards has become accepted suggests to what a degree we have become accustomed to
these usages. They disguise entirely separate dimensions of interpretive and remedial choices, however. Decisions that adopt
entirely irreconcilable approaches can claim to be applying the
same reasonableness doctrine. These doctrines should be unpacked and distinguished, even if in practice they can overlap
and confuse. Better yet, federal judges should avoid using reasonableness as a fig leaf to disguise the rights and values they
interpret and balance. Using different terms for different concepts would be a welcome change, even if the umbrella term reasonableness remains so attractive that it is retained.
Still better, under the model that I advance, and that others
have developed in contexts such as the Fourth Amendment, and
which the Supreme Court uses in certain contexts already, constitutional interpretation could incentivize evidence-informed
practices. That is, the salutary role reasonableness is supposed
to serve in the negligence context: incentivizing reasonable
standards of care. A range of scholars have advanced a new focus
on regulatory models to better adopt systemic and empirically
informed regulation to protect constitutional rights. There have
been concerns, though, whether courts have the right cases, or
access to sufficient data, or institutional ability to incentivize
such review.275 The experience in the Eighth Amendment prison
conditions area suggests those concerns can be warranted if
judges do not carefully adopt a regulatory concept of reasonableness, but rather slide back into an approach that is broadly deferential to regulators. Reasonableness review, even if better informed, may be simply too “nebulous,” as Judge Traynor put it,
to carefully inform doctrine. 276
While taking those concerns seriously, this Article does
point out just how many doctrines are amenable to a more rigor275. For a discussion of those concerns, see also Crespo, supra note 24, at
2060–61 (collecting sources and offering a critique).
276. TRAYNOR, supra note 273.
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ous regulatory reasonableness approach. There are many attractive places in the doctrine in which such an empirically informed
view of reasonableness could be adopted, now that the doctrine
is shot through with constitutional reasonableness review. Without such a shift, there will be little that is reasonable about constitutional reasonableness. Even if this positive proposal for a
shift in approach towards an empirically informed model does
not take hold, I hope the negative and critical aspects of this discussion may not only illuminate the multiple dimensions that
reasonableness can operate under, but also how duplication and
confusion across different aspects of constitutional law can make
the job of a judge nearly impossible. The doctrine certainly defies
the expectations of litigants and the public. I have also argued
that the spread of constitutional reasonableness is understandable—if deplorable. The vagueness, flexibility, and malleability
of reasonableness explains its ubiquity and utility. Today, however, without committing to any one usage, a judge or court can
shift the meaning of entire constitutional standards, without
seeming to change its reasonableness label. That shape-shifting
ambiguity across multiple dimensions is the source of the power,
the attraction, and the danger of constitutional reasonableness.

